<P> In states whose "stop and identify laws" do not directly impose penalties, a lawful arrest must be for violation of some other law, such as one to the effect of "resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer". For example, the Nevada "stop and identify" law challenged in Hiibel did not impose a penalty on a person who refused to comply, but the Justice Court of Union Township, Nevada, determined that Hiibels refusal to identify himself constituted a violation of Nevada "obstructing" law . A similar conclusion regarding the interaction between Utah "stop and identify" and "obstructing" laws was reached in Oliver v. Woods (10th Cir. 2000). </P> <P> "Stop and identify" laws in different states that appear to be nearly identical may be different in effect because of interpretations by state courts . For example, California "stop and identify" law, Penal Code § 647 (e) had wording similar to the Nevada law upheld in Hiibel, but a California appellate court, in People v. Solomon (1973), 33 Cal. App. 3d 429 construed the law to require "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity . Using this construction, the U.S. Supreme Court held the law to be void for vagueness in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). </P> <P> Some courts have recognized a distinction authorizing police to demand identifying information and specifically imposing an obligation of a suspect to respond . Other courts have apparently interpreted demand to impose an obligation on the detainee to comply . </P> <P> Wording and interpretation by state courts of "obstructing" laws also varies; for example, New York "obstructing" law apparently requires physical rather than simply verbal obstruction; likewise, a violation of the Colorado "obstructing" law appears to require use or threat of use of physical force . However, the Colorado Supreme Court held in Dempsey v. People, No. 04SC362 (2005) (PDF) that refusing to provide identification was an element in the "totality of the circumstances" that could constitute obstructing an officer, even when actual physical interference was not employed . Utah "obstructing" law does not require a physical act, but merely a failure to follow a "lawful order...necessary to effect the...detention"; a divided court in Oliver v. Woods concluded that failure to present identification constituted a violation of that law . </P>

Supreme court ruling on showing id to police