<P> Parizeau's immediate plans after the referendum relied upon what he felt would be general pressure from economic markets and the business community in English Canada to stabilize the situation as quickly as possible, which he believed would mitigate any catastrophic initial events (such as blockades) and prepare for negotiations . </P> <P> Despite the prominent placement of Bouchard in the referendum campaign, Parizeau planned to retain all authority with regard to negotiations, and to appoint most members of the negotiation team if they were to occur . Parizeau also believed federalist Quebecers such as Chrétien and Charest would be quickly disregarded and replaced at negotiations by representatives from the other nine provinces . If the Federal government refused to negotiate, or if negotiations were to exceed October 30, 1996, Parizeau stated that he would proceed with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) for an independent Quebec pursuant to Section 26 of the Sovereignty Bill . </P> <P> Parizeau's hopes for international recognition, a practical requirement of statehood, rested with France and the Francophonie . He believed that if Quebec declared independence in these circumstances, President of the French National Assembly Philippe Séguin, a powerful Gaullist power broker who was sympathetic to the sovereignty movement, would pressure President Chirac to recognize the declaration . He counted on a French recognition to spread quickly to the Francophonie and bring the issue to a head . Benoit Bouchard, Canada's ambassador at the time, believed that the plan was irrational as he doubted Séguin, who was supposed to be a neutral figure in his role, could bring sufficient pressure in the country's semi-presidential system . </P> <P> In interviews conducted in 2014, Bouchard and Dumont both believed that negotiations would have resulted had the "Yes" side won and that Quebec would have remained in Canada with a more autonomous status . Bouchard, while approving of Parizeau's intention to unilaterally declare independence should negotiations be refused, implied that he and Dumont would have been able to control negotiations and offer a subsequent referendum on a new agreement . Dumont noted that international recognition would have been difficult had two of the three leaders of the "Yes" campaign been against a UDI, and that he and Bouchard were willing to slow the process down if necessary . For his part, Bernard Landry believed that nothing short of a seat at the United Nations would have been accomplished had the "Yes" won . </P>

1995 independence referendum in the canadian province of quebec