<P> We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which is mankind are capable; we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all humans beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them . </P> <P> The description of ideal utilitarianism was first used by Hastings Rashdall in The Theory of Good and Evil (1907), but it is more often associated with G.E. Moore . In Ethics (1912), Moore rejected a purely hedonistic utilitarianism and argued that there is a range of values that might be maximized . Moore's strategy was to show that it is intuitively implausible that pleasure is the sole measure of what is good . He says that such an assumption: </P> <P> involves our saying, for instance, that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed--no knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities--must yet be intrinsically better--better worth creating--provided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existed as well as pleasure . </P> <P> It involves our saying that, even if the total quantity of pleasure in each was exactly equal, yet the fact that all the beings in the one possessed in addition knowledge of many different kinds and a full appreciation of all that was beautiful or worthy of love in their world, whereas none of the beings in the other possessed any of these things, would give us no reason whatever for preferring the former to the latter . </P>

Who advocates higher order pleasures within utilitarian theory