<P> Within the ruling party, the Policy of National Reconciliation was criticised by those who believed it would result in the PDPA losing power over the country, while the opponents of the PDPA and the Soviet Union dismissed the efforts as propaganda . Hampered by the slow pace at which top - level policy decisions were implemented on the ground, and realising that the Policy of National Reconciliation by itself would not result in a favourable outcome, the Soviet leadership began looking for alternate ways to create the necessary degree of stability in Afghanistan for a withdrawal to be permissible . </P> <P> Beginning in early 1987, Soviet faith in the Policy of National Reconciliation in the format in which it was initially conceived began to falter . While previously the preeminence of the PDPA in leadership, and the desired identity of Najibullah as the party leader was indisputable for the Soviet leadership, now the "emerging consensus in the Politburo was that the PDPA would be but one of the political forces in power after Soviet troops left . Even Kryuchkov and Gromyko agreed that reconciliation would mean accepting that the PDPA would lose its leading position". In a personal meeting on the July 20 1987, Gorbachev again attempted to impress on Najibullah the need to incorporate opposition leaders into the Afghan government, but this effort, like earlier, was weakened by Najibullah's biliateral conversations with Shevarnadze and Kryuchkov . Najubullah retained a strong hold over Kabul and the government apparatus--bar internal divisions within the PDPA--but was not able to incorporate the opposition into the government in any meaningful way, instead giving out "relatively powerless posts to prominent non-PDPA personalities who had until then neither supported nor opposed the government ." </P> <P> Faced by the failure of the Policy of National Reconciliation to stabilise the country by itself, and hoping to benefit from the gradually thawing relationship with the United States, the Soviet Union pushed forward with its effort to attain a diplomatic solution that would limit Pakistani and American interference in Afghanistan . Throughout 1987, Soviet diplomats attempted to convince the United States to stop supplying the mujahideen with weaponry as soon as Soviet forces withdrew, and to reach an agreement on a power - sharing proposal that would permit the PDPA to remain a key actor in Afghan politics . Najibullah was receptive to the prior, but the Soviet Union did not manage to come to this agreement with the United States . From statements made by Secretary of State Shultz, the Soviet leadership came under the impression that the US would cease military shipments to the mujahideen immediately after Soviet withdrawal, with the condition that the USSR "front - loaded" its withdrawal (i.e. withdrew the majority of its troops in the beginning of the process, thereby complicating redeployment). This was conveyed to the Najibullah government, managing to convince him that the Soviet - American diplomatic effort would benefit the Kabul government . </P> <P> This impression made by Shultz was false--though mixed signals were sent by various US officials at and around time of the summit, Reagan could not agree to stop arms shipments immediately . In late 1987, when this US commitment was conveyed to the Soviet Union, negotiations came to a halt, but proceeded tentatively as the White House and Department of State continued to make contradictory statements on the issue . The issue dissipated when the Department of State suggested that an immediate cessation of US military aid could occur if the Soviets did the same (prior, the US had agreed to an asymmetric cessation of aid, whereby the USSR would be allowed to continue supporting Kabul). On February 8 1988, the Soviet leadership to announce a conditional date for the beginning of the military withdrawal (which the United States had insisted on for years) in an attempt to encourage the US to compromise on ceasing military shipments . This announcement failed to change the American position on shipments, and simultaneously decreased Soviet bargaining power at the negotiations . Nevertheless, Gorbachev decided that </P>

Who forced the soviets to withdraw from afghanistan in 1989