<P> Nishimura's force consisted of two battleships, one cruiser and four destroyers . Because they were observing radio silence, Nishimura was unable to synchronize with Shima and Kurita . Nishimura and Shima had failed to even coordinate their plans before the attacks--they were long - time rivals and neither wished to have anything to do with the other . When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at about 02: 00, Shima was 22 miles (40 km) behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte . As they passed Panaon Island, Nishimura's force ran into a trap set for them by the US - Australian 7th Fleet Support Force . R. Adm. Jesse Oldendorf had six battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 29 destroyers and 39 PT boats . To pass the strait and reach the landings, Nishimura had to run the gauntlet . At about 03: 00 the Japanese battleship Fusō and three destroyers were hit by torpedoes and Fusō broke in two . At 03: 50 the US battleships opened fire . Radar fire control meant they could hit targets from a much greater distance than the Japanese . The battleship Yamashiro, a cruiser and a destroyer were crippled by 16 - inch (406 mm) shells; Yamashiro sank at 04: 19 . Only one of Nishimura's force of seven ships survived the engagement . At 04: 25 Shima's force of two cruisers and eight destroyers reached the battle . Seeing Fusō and believing her to be the wrecks of two battleships, Shima ordered a retreat, ending the last battleship - vs - battleship action in history . </P> <P> Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers, two obsolete battleships partly converted to carriers, three cruisers and nine destroyers . The carriers had only 108 planes . The force was not spotted by the Allies until 16: 40 on 24 October . At 20: 00 Toyoda ordered all remaining Japanese forces to attack . Halsey saw an opportunity to destroy the remnants of the Japanese carrier force . The US Third Fleet was formidable--nine large carriers, eight light carriers, six battleships, 17 cruisers, 63 destroyers and 1,000 planes--and completely outgunned Ozawa's force . Halsey's ships set out in pursuit of Ozawa just after midnight . US commanders ignored reports that Kurita had turned back towards San Bernardino Strait . They had taken the bait set by Ozawa . On the morning of 25 October Ozawa launched 75 planes . Most were shot down by US fighter patrols . By 08: 00 US fighters had destroyed the screen of Japanese fighters and were hitting ships . By evening, they had sunk the carriers Zuikaku, Zuihō, and Chiyoda, and a destroyer . The fourth carrier, Chitose, and a cruiser were disabled and later sank . </P> <P> Kurita passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03: 00 on 25 October and headed along the coast of Samar . The only thing standing in his path were three groups (Taffy 1, 2 and 3) of the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral Thomas Kinkaid . Each group had six escort carriers, with a total of more than 500 planes, and seven or eight destroyers or destroyer escorts (DE). Kinkaid still believed that Lee's force was guarding the north, so the Japanese had the element of surprise when they attacked Taffy 3 at 06: 45 . Kurita mistook the Taffy carriers for large fleet carriers and thought he had the whole Third Fleet in his sights . Since escort carriers stood little chance against a battleship, Adm. Clifton Sprague directed the carriers of Taffy 3 to turn and flee eastward, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and used his destroyers to divert the Japanese battleships . The destroyers made harassing torpedo attacks against the Japanese . For ten minutes Yamato was caught up in evasive action . Two US destroyers and a DE were sunk, but they had bought enough time for the Taffy groups to launch planes . Taffy 3 turned and fled south, with shells scoring hits on some of its carriers and sinking one of them . The superior speed of the Japanese force allowed it to draw closer and fire on the other two Taffy groups . However, at 09: 20 Kurita suddenly turned and retreated north . Signals had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the Third Fleet, and the longer Kurita continued to engage, the greater the risk of major air strikes . Destroyer attacks had broken the Japanese formations, shattering tactical control . Three of Kurita's heavy cruisers had been sunk and another was too damaged to continue the fight . The Japanese retreated through the San Bernardino Strait, under continuous air attack . The Battle of Leyte Gulf was over; and a large part of the Japanese surface fleet destroyed . </P> <P> The battle secured the beachheads of the US Sixth Army on Leyte against attack from the sea, broke the back of Japanese naval power and opened the way for an advance to the Ryukyu Islands in 1945 . The only significant Japanese naval operation afterwards was the disastrous Operation Ten - Go in April 1945 . Kurita's force had begun the battle with five battleships; when he returned to Japan, only Yamato was combat - worthy . Nishimura's sunken Yamashiro was the last battleship in history to engage another in combat . </P>

What were the objectives of the american offensives in the war