<P> The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration . While Kennedy had originally supported the policy of sending military advisers to Diem, he had begun to alter his thinking due to what he perceived to be the ineptitude of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms (which led to a U.S. - supported coup which resulted in the death of Diem). Shortly before his assassination, in November 1963, Kennedy had begun a limited recall of U.S. forces . Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military escalation as a means of challenging what was perceived to be the Soviet Union's expansionist policies . The Cold War policy of containment was to be applied to prevent the fall of Southeast Asia to communism under the precepts of the domino theory . After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more U.S. forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia . </P> <P> A highly classified program of covert actions against North Vietnam known as Operation Plan 34 - Alpha, in conjunction with the DESOTO operations, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961 . In 1964 the program was transferred to the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACV - SOG). </P> <P> For the maritime portion of the covert operation, a set of fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam . In 1963 three young Norwegian skippers traveled on a mission in South Vietnam . They were recruited for the job by the Norwegian intelligence officer Alf Martens Meyer . Martens Meyer, who was head of department at the military intelligence staff, operated on behalf of U.S. intelligence . The three skippers did not know who Meyer really was when they agreed to a job that involved them in sabotage missions against North Vietnam . Although the boats were crewed by South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval for each mission conducted under the plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Jr., CINCPAC in Honolulu, who received his orders from the White House . After the coastal attacks began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva Accords, but the U.S. denied any involvement . Four years later, Secretary McNamara admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South Vietnamese attacks against North Vietnam . Maddox, although aware of the operations, was not directly involved . </P> <P> What was generally not considered by U.S. politicians at the time were the other actions taken under Operations Plan 34 - Alpha just prior to the incident . The night before the launching of the actions against North Vietnamese facilities on Hòn Mê and Hòn Ngư islands, the SOG had launched a covert long - term agent team into North Vietnam, which was promptly captured . That night (for the second evening in a row), two flights of CIA - sponsored Laotian fighter - bombers (piloted by Thai mercenaries) attacked border outposts well within southwestern North Vietnam . The Hanoi government (which, unlike the U.S. government, had to give permission at the highest levels for the conduct of such missions) probably assumed that they were all a coordinated effort to escalate military actions against North Vietnam . </P>

How did the american government react to reports about the incident in the gulf of tonkin