<P> As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged, and Kennedy was slowly persuaded . The new plan called for him to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one . Kennedy was initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but Llewellyn Thompson argued that it was still possible . White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later, with a draft letter to that effect . The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it . </P> <P> After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office . The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Dobrynin that stated that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them . Rusk added one proviso that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed "voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath . The President agreed, and the message was sent . </P> <P> At Rusk's request, Fomin and Scali met again . Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of "poor communications ." Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a "stinking double cross ." He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, and Fomin stated that a response to the US message was expected from Khrushchev shortly and urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended . Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message . The two went their separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM . </P> <P> Within the US establishment, it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position . Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action . Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood: "We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours . It was a hope, not an expectation . The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday (October 30), and possibly tomorrow (October 29)..." </P>

Who was involved with the cuban missile crisis