<P> Martin Heidegger aptly characterizes Husserl's phenomenological research project as, "...the analytic description of intentionality in its a priori" (Heidegger: 1992); as it is the phenomenon of intentionality which provides the mode of access for conducting any and all phenomenological investigations, and the ultimate ground or foundation guaranteeing any findings resulting from any such inquiry . In recognizing consciousness as having the formal structure of intentionality, as always having consciousness of an intended object, Husserlian phenomenology has located the access point to a radical new form of scientific description . </P> <P> Methodologically, access to this field is obtained through the phenomenological reduction . While there is some controversy as to the official name, number, and levels of the reduction, this internal argument among the philosophers need not concern us . For the purposes of a mundane phenomenology of the social world, we, as phenomenological social scientists, engage in a mundane phenomenological reduction called the Epoché . The hallmark of this form of the reduction is what it reveals about its field of inquiry: a mundane phenomenology of the social world defines its phenomenal field as the intersubjective region of mundane consciousness as appearing from within the natural attitude . </P> <P> The phenomenological reduction as applied to a mundane analysis of the social world consists of the bracketing (equivalents: methodical disregard, putting out of play, suspension) of the thesis of the natural attitude . This bracketing is nothing more than a bracketing of the existential belief in the existence of the objective world; the existential status of the world itself is not called into question . The result of this bracketing is that our attention is shifted from the objects in the world as they occur in nature, to the objects in the world as they appear for consciousness - as phenomenon for intentional consciousness . Our descriptions of objects in the world are now transformed from the naive descriptions of objects as occurring in nature, to phenomenological descriptions of objects as appearing for consciousness . In short, for the purpose of a mundane phenomenological analysis within the natural attitude, the epoche transforms objects as occurring in nature into: objects - for - subjectivity, objects - for - consciousness, objects - as - intended . </P> <P> Keep in mind that for positivism, the meaning of an object is, by definition, "objective". That is, the meaning of the object is a property of the object itself, is independent of any particular observer, and "the same" for any and all observers regardless of their orientation or perspective . For phenomenology, an object is always intended, and constituted, as meaningful by a particular intending subject from a particular orientation and from a particular perspectival viewing point . In addition, phenomenologically speaking, the meaning of the object cannot be separated from its phenomenonality, or materiality, and cannot be constituted qua meaningful object without the meaning bestowing act of intending on the part of a constituting subject . </P>

Who introduced the theory of phenomenology in educational sociology