<P> In spite of this, however, Stevens said that the debate did not necessarily end there . He noted that the Supreme Court had found capital punishment to be constitutionally permissible, but had later also said that it could potentially be impermissibly cruel . As such, simply deciding that a certain statute outlawing assisted suicide was constitutional did not mean that every possible application would be likewise . He stated that he believed that a state had a compelling interest in preventing suicide prompted by depression or coercion; however, this interest does not apply when people are competent to make decisions and who are not being coerced or abused into decision . </P> <P> Stevens also rejected the argument, raised by the petitioners, that permitting physician - assisted suicide would taint the perception of the doctor / patient relationship . In some cases, he argued, a doctor's refusal to hasten death could be perceived as an act contrary to the doctor's role of healer . In cases such as these, he believed that the relationship would not be hindered by permitting the doctor to aid in the patient's demise . </P> <P> To conclude his opinion, Stevens stated once more that he agreed with the majority finding, and that the rationale in the decision was well founded . However, he drew a distinction between finding a law generally acceptable and finding it acceptable in all cases . While agreeing in principle, he noted that there could be some instances where the law unjustly infringed upon a patient's personal liberty . </P> <P> Justice Souter issued a short clarifying concurrence, noting that he agreed with the ruling, but also stressing that he felt the claims raised were significant enough to warrant further justification . He cited his own concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702 (1997), reiterating that he felt the distinction between the permitted refusal of treatment and the prohibited assisted suicide was not an arbitrary one . </P>

Right to die cases decided by the supreme court