<P> In regards to the Silesian plebiscite, Blanke observed "given that the electorate was at least 60% Polish - speaking, this means that about one' Pole' in three voted for Germany" and "most Polish observers and historians" have concluded that the outcome of plebiscite was due to "unfair German advantages of incumbency and socio - economic position". Blanke alleged "coercion of various kinds even in the face of an allied occupation regime" occurred, and that Germany granted votes to those "who had been born in Upper Silesia but no longer resided there". Blanke concluded that despite these protests "there is plenty of other evidence, including Reichstag election results both before and after 1921 and the large - scale emigration of Polish - speaking Upper Silesians to Germany after 1945, that their identification with Germany in 1921 was neither exceptional nor temporary" and "here was a large population of Germans and Poles--not coincidentally, of the same Catholic religion--that not only shared the same living space but also came in many cases to see themselves as members of the same national community". Prince Eustachy Sapieha, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, alleged that Soviet Russia "appeared to be intentionally delaying negotiations" to end the Polish - Soviet War "with the object of influencing the Upper Silesian plebiscite". Once the region was partitioned, both "Germany and Poland attempted to' cleanse' their shares of Upper Silesia" via oppression resulting in Germans migrating to Germany and Poles migrating to Poland . Despite the oppression and migration, Opole Silesia "remained ethnically mixed ." </P> <P> Frank Russell wrote that, in regards to the Saar plebiscite, the inhabitants "were not terrorized at the polls" and the "totalitarian (Nazi) German regime was not distasteful to most of the Saar inhabitants and that they preferred it even to an efficient, economical, and benevolent international rule ." When the outcome of the vote became known, 4,100 (including 800 refugees who had previously fled Germany) residents fled over the border into France . </P> <P> During the formulation of the treaty, the British wanted Germany to abolish conscription and be allowed to maintain volunteer Army . The French wanted Germany to maintain a conscript army of up to 200,000 men in order to justify their own maintenance of a similar force . Thus the treaty's allowance of 100,000 volunteers was a compromise between the British and French positions . Germany, on the other hand, saw the terms as leaving them defenseless against any potential enemy . Bernadotte Everly Schmitt wrote that "there is no reason to believe that the Allied governments were insincere when they stated at the beginning of Part V of the Treaty...that in order to facilitate a general reduction of the armament of all nations, Germany was to be required to disarm first ." A lack of American ratification of the treaty or joining the League of Nations left France unwilling to disarm, which resulted in a German unwillingness to rearm . Schmitt argued "had the four Allies remained united, they could have forced Germany really to disarm, and the German will and capacity to resist other provisions of the treaty would have correspondingly diminished ." Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer wrote "military and economic historians (have) found that the German military only insignificantly exceeded the limits" of the treaty prior to 1933 . Adam Tooze concurred, and wrote "To put this in perspective, annual military spending by the Weimar Republic was counted not in the billions but in the hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks"; for example, the Weimar Republic's 1931 program of 480 million Reichsmarks over five years compared to the Nazi Government's 1933 plan to spend 4.4 billion Reichsmarks per year . P.M.H. Bell argued that the British Government was aware of latter Weimar rearming, and lent public respectability to the German efforts by not opposing them . Norman Davies wrote that "a curious oversight" of the military restrictions were that they "did not include rockets in its list of prohibited weapons", which provided Wernher von Braun an area to research within eventually resulting in "his break (that) came in 1943" leading to the development of the V - 2 rocket . </P>

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