<P> Bruce Russett (1993, p. 5--11, 35, 59--62, 73--4) also argues that the democratic culture affects the way leaders resolve conflicts . In addition, he holds that a social norm emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century; that democracies should not fight each other, which strengthened when the democratic culture and the degree of democracy increased, for example by widening the franchise . Increasing democratic stability allowed partners in foreign affairs to perceive a nation as reliably democratic . The alliances between democracies during the two World Wars and the Cold War also strengthened the norms . He sees less effective traces of this norm in Greek antiquity . </P> <P> Hans Köchler (1995) relates the question of transnational democracy to empowering the individual citizen by involving him, through procedures of direct democracy, in a country's international affairs, and he calls for the restructuring of the United Nations Organization according to democratic norms . He refers in particular to the Swiss practice of participatory democracy . </P> <P> Mousseau (2000, 2005) argues that it is market - oriented development that creates the norms and values that explain both democracy and the peace . In less developed countries individuals often depend on social networks that impose conformity to in - group norms and beliefs, and loyalty to group leaders . When jobs are plentiful on the market, in contrast, as in market - oriented developed countries, individuals depend on a strong state that enforces contracts equally . Cognitive routines emerge of abiding by state law rather than group leaders, and, as in contracts, tolerating differences among individuals . Voters in marketplace democracies thus accept only impartial' liberal' governments, and constrain leaders to pursue their interests in securing equal access to global markets and in resisting those who distort such access with force . Marketplace democracies thus share common foreign policy interests in the supremacy--and predictability--of international law over brute power politics, and equal and open global trade over closed trade and imperial preferences . When disputes do originate between marketplace democracies, they are less likely than others to escalate to violence because both states, even the stronger one, perceive greater long - term interests in the supremacy of law over power politics . </P> <P> (Braumoeller 1997) argues that liberal norms of conflict resolution vary because liberalism takes many forms . By examining survey results from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the author demonstrates that liberalism in that region bears a stronger resemblance to 19th - century liberal nationalism than to the sort of universalist, Wilsonian liberalism described by democratic peace theorists, and that, as a result, liberals in the region are more, not less, aggressive than non-liberals . </P>

What policy is generally considered important based on the logic of democratic-peace theory