<P> Laffert had expected that the two Eingreif divisions behind Messines Ridge would reach the Höhen (second) line before the British . The divisions had reached assembly areas near Gheluvelt and Warneton by 7: 00 a.m. and the 7th Division was ordered to move from Zandvoorde to Hollebeke, to attack across the Comines canal towards Wijtschate on the British northern flank . The 1st Guard Reserve Division was to move to the Warneton line east of Messines, then advance around Messines to recapture the original front system . Both Eingreif divisions were plagued by delays, being new to the area and untrained for counter-attack operations . The 7th Division was shelled by British artillery all the way to the Comines canal, then part of the division was diverted to reinforce the remnants of the front divisions holding positions around Hollebeke . The rest of the division found that the British had already taken the Sehnenstellung (Oosttaverne) line, by the time that they arrived at 4: 00 p.m. The 1st Guard Reserve Division was also bombarded as it crossed the Warneton (third) line but reached the area east of Messines by 3: 00 p.m., only to be devastated by the resumption of the British creeping barrage and forced back to the Sehnenstellung (Oosttaverne) line as the British began to advance to their next objective . Laffert contemplated a further withdrawal, then ordered the existing line to be held after the British advance stopped . Most of the losses inflicted on the British infantry by the German defence came from artillery fire . In the days after the main attack, German shellfire on the new British lines was extremely accurate and well - timed, inflicting 90 percent of the casualties suffered by the 25th Division . </P> <P> Historians and writers disagree on the strategic significance of the battle, although most describe it as a British tactical and operational success . In 1919, Ludendorff wrote that the British victory cost the German army dear and drained German reserves . Hindenburg wrote that the losses at Messines had been "very heavy" and that he regretted that the ground had not been evacuated; in 1922, Kuhl called it one of the worst German tragedies of the war . In 1920 Haig's Dispatches described the success of the British plan, organisation and results but refrained from hyperbole, referring to the operation as a successful preliminary to the main offensive at Ypres . In 1930, Liddell Hart thought the success at Messines inflated expectations for the Third Battle of Ypres and that because the circumstances of the operations were different, attempts to apply similar tactics resulted in failure . In 1938 Lloyd George called the battle an apéritif and in 1939, G.C. Wynne judged it to be a "brilliant success", overshadowed by the subsequent tragedy of the Battles of Passchendaele . The Official Historian called it a "great victory" in 1948 and Prior and Wilson (1997) called the battle a "noteworthy success" but then complained about the decision to postpone exploitation of the success on the Gheluvelt plateau . Ashley Ekins referred to the battle as a great set - piece victory, which was also costly, particularly for the infantry of II Anzac Corps, as did Christopher Pugsley, referring to the experience of the New Zealand Division . Heinz Hagenlücke called it a great British success and wrote that the loss of the ridge, had a worse effect on German morale than the number of casualties . Jack Sheldon called it a "significant victory" for the British and a "disaster" for the German army, which was forced into a "lengthy period of anxious waiting". Brown in 1996 and Simpson in 2001 concluded that extending British supply routes over the ridge, which had been devastated by the mines and millions of shells, to consolidate the Oosttaverne line and completion of the infrastructure further north in the Fifth Army area, was necessary before the Northern Operation (Third Battle of Ypres) could begin and was the main reason for the operational pause in June and July . </P> <P> In 1941 the Australian Official Historian recorded II Anzac Corps losses from 1 to 14 June as 4,978 casualties in the New Zealand Division, 3,379 casualties in the 3rd Australian Division and 2,677 casualties in the 4th Australian Division . Using figures from the Reichsarchiv, Bean recorded German casualties for 21--31 May, 1,963; 1--10 June, 19,923 (including 7,548 missing); 11--20 June, 5,501 and 21--30 June, 1,773 . In volume XII of Der Weltkrieg the German Official Historians recorded 25,000 casualties for the period 21 May--10 June including 10,000 missing of whom 7,200 were reported as taken prisoner by the British . Losses of the British were recorded as 25,000 casualties and a further 3,000 missing from 18 May to 14 June . The initial explosion of the mines, in particular the mine that created the Lone Tree Crater, accounts for the high number of casualties and missing from 1 to 10 June . In 1948, the British Official Historian gave casualties of II Anzac Corps, 12,391; IX Corps, 5,263; X Corps, 6,597; II Corps, 108 and VIII Corps, 203 a total of 24,562 casualties from 1 to 12 June . The 25th Division history gave 3,052 casualties and the 47th Division history notes 2,303 casualties . The British Official Historian recorded 21,886 German casualties, including 7,548 missing, from 21 May to 10 June, using strength returns from groups Ypern, Wijtschate and Lille in the German Official History, then wrote that 30 percent should be added for wounded likely to return to duty within a reasonable time, since they were "omitted" in the German Official History, reasoning which has been severely criticised ever since . In 2007 Sheldon gave 22,988 casualties for the German 4th Army from 1 to 10 June 1917 . </P> <P> At 3: 00 a.m. on 8 June, the British attack to regain the Oosttaverne line from the river Douve to the Warneton road found few German garrisons as it was occupied . German artillery south of the Lys bombarded the southern slopes of the ridge and caused considerable losses among Anzac troops pinned there . Ignorance of the situation north of the Warneton road continued; a reserve battalion was sent to reinforce the 49th Australian Battalion near the Blauwepoortbeek for the 3: 00 a.m. attack, which did not take place . The 4th Australian Division commander, Major - General William Holmes, went forward at 4: 00 a.m. and finally clarified the situation . New orders instructed the 33rd Brigade (11th Division) to side - step to the right and relieve the 52nd Australian Battalion, which at dusk would move to the south and join the 49th Australian Battalion for the attack into the gap at the Blauwepoortbeek . All went well until observers on the ridge saw the 52nd Australian Battalion withdrawing, mistook it for a German counter-attack and called for an SOS bombardment . German observers in the valley saw troops from the 33rd Brigade moving into the area to relieve the Australian battalion mistook them for an attacking force and also called for an SOS bombardment . The area was deluged with artillery fire from both sides for two hours, causing many casualties and the attack was postponed until 9 June . </P>

How many australian troops died in the battle of messines