<P> Without the Irish treaty ports (which the United Kingdom had released a year prior to the war), an independent Ireland posed a serious disadvantage to the military capability and safety of British fighting and trade, risking the possibility of invasion if that disadvantage ever proved too great . If Irish sovereignty was to be maintained, then neutrality would have to be steered consciously to the benefit of British interests, as these were its own: at once to aid the British war effort but also to forestall invasion by Britain to regain the treaty ports . Ireland, like other neutrals was'...neutral for the power that potentially threatened them most .' During the war, and accusing de Valera as a' Nazi sympathiser', the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Lord Craigavon, urged Churchill to use Scottish and Welsh troops to overrun' southern Ireland' before installing a Governor - General for the whole island at Dublin, but this proposal was rejected by London . Nevertheless, Churchill directed Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery to prepare plans to seize Cork and Queenstown (Cobh) so their harbours could be used as naval bases . Better submarine - detecting technology, as well as military bases in Iceland, meant that the Irish ports were no longer as vital for the Allies as they had been during World War I . </P> <P> In this regard Viscount Cranborne acknowledged at the war's end that the Irish Government had'...been willing to accord us any facilities which would not be regarded as overtly prejudicing their attitude to neutrality', collaborating with the British war cabinet . (See below for complete text .) The pattern of co-operation between British and Irish agencies began upon the onset of war when de Valera permitted the use of specified Irish airspace mainly for patrolling coastal points . The use of the "Donegal Corridor", the narrow strip of Irish territory between County Fermanagh and the sea, was significant . By the autumn of 1941 use of the corridor was a daily routine . While de Valera rejected British appeals to use Irish ports and harbour facilities directly, de Valera was, according to M.E. Collins,' more friendly than strict neutrality should have allowed .' The co-operation that emerged allowed for meetings to take place to consider events after German troops had overrun neutral Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium . Three days after the fall of France, Irish and British defence officials met to discuss how British troops could, strictly at de Valera's invitation, occupy Ireland upon the event of a German landing there to expel foreign troops attempting to use her as a back door to later invade Britain (Plan "W"). The meetings continued, as Cranborne described, throughout the war, facilitating further dialogue . </P> <P> Before the war began, de Valera had held a meeting with career diplomat Dr. Eduard Hempel, the German Minister in Ireland since 1938 . The meetings discussed Ireland's close trade links with the United Kingdom and the ease with which Britain could invade her if its interests were threatened . He in turn communicated to Berlin that such was the case that it' rendered it inevitable for the Irish government to show a certain consideration for Britain' and urged war officials to avoid any action that would legitimise a British invasion of Ireland . In mid-June 1940, Secretary of External Affairs Joe Walshe expressed his' great admiration for the German achievements .' Hempel, for his part, wrote to Germany of' the great and decisive importance even to Ireland of the changed situation in world affairs and of the obvious weakness of the democracies .' Hempel might well have known better of Irish intentions, having earlier described a native custom' to say agreeable things without meaning everything that is said .' </P> <P> Other examples of Irish attitudes towards Nazi Germany found expression in mid-1940 in de Valera's Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, William Warnock,' whose "unquestionable" hostility to Britain could easily be interpreted as sympathetic for National Socialism .' Academic J.J. Lee questioned just how much of Warnock's zeal towards Hitler's Reichstag speech on 19 July was genuine enthusiasm for the' international justice' that could be expected after Germany's victory, as opposed to an adherence to the instructions of Dublin to please oneself to the potential victors . Three years later, by 1944, the orientation of the war and of Irish relations to Germany had turned about - face, with the likelihood of a German victory now remote . In that climate the Irish Government, once so ready to' say agreeable things', Hempel remarked, had become' unhelpful and evasive' . </P>

What part did ireland play in world war ii