<P> "In Paris one begins to realise that Germany wants to overturn the current status, be it through real concerns or fictitious ones . One no longer sees it as an absolute casus belli, as in the recent past, but the politicians believe a judgement on this matter must come first and foremost from the Army General Staff . There has naturally been discussion over the consequences, but to date, no consensus has been reached . One group believes that given the extraordinary advances in military motorization, the entire question is less a matter of practical military significance than of moral value to the German self - image . Another group in the General Staff are of the opinion that remilitarization could only be accepted if a full reorganization of the border defense system were to take place and above all if the defensive garrisons were promptly improved . As the situation stands today, one is neither ready nor willingly unhesitating to go to war over the eventuality of a German reoccupation (the last sentence was underlined by Neurath)." </P> <P> Aschmann did not explicitly state this, but he strongly implied that he had bribed Montiny into talking so frankly . Neurath did not pass on Aschmann's report to Hitler, but he placed a high value upon it . Neurath was seeking to improve his position within the Nazi regime; by repeatedly assuring Hitler during the Rhineland crisis that the French would do nothing without telling Hitler the source of his self - assurance, Neurath came across as a diplomat blessed with an uncanny intuition, something that improved his standing with Hitler . Traditionally in Germany the conduct of foreign policy had been the work of the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office), but starting in 1933 Neurath had been faced with the threat of Nazi "interlopers in diplomacy" as various NSDAP agencies started to conduct their own foreign policies independent of and often against the Auswärtiges Amt . The most serious of the "interlopers in diplomacy" was the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, a sort of alternative foreign ministry loosely linked to the NSDAP headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop which aggressively sought to undercut the work of the Auswärtiges Amt at every turn . Further exacerbating the rivalry between the Dienststelle Ribbentrop and the Auswärtiges Amt was the fact that Neurath and Ribbentrop utterly hated one another, with Ribbentrop making no secret of his belief that he would be a much better foreign minister than Neurath, whereas Neurath viewed Ribbentrop as a hopelessly inept amateur diplomat meddling in matters that did not concern him . In this environment, Baron von Neurath was determined to prove to Hitler that he, a professional diplomat of the old school who had joined the Auswärtiges Amt in 1901 was the man best qualified to carry out the Reich's foreign policy, and thereby prove that the Auswärtiges Amt should be allowed to conduct foreign policy alone as traditionally had been the case rather than the Nazi "interlopers in diplomacy". </P> <P> During January 1936, the German Chancellor and Führer Adolf Hitler decided to reoccupy the Rhineland . Originally Hitler had planned to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1937, but chose in early 1936 to move re-militarization forward by a year for several reasons, namely: the ratification by the French National Assembly of the Franco - Soviet pact of 1935 allowed him to present his coup both at home and abroad as a defensive move against Franco - Soviet "encirclement"; the expectation that France would be better armed in 1937; the government in Paris had just fallen and a caretaker government was in charge; economic problems at home required a foreign policy success to restore the regime's popularity; the Italo - Ethiopian War, which had set Britain against Italy, had effectively broken up the Stresa Front; and apparently because Hitler simply did not feel like waiting an extra year . In his biography of Hitler, the British historian Sir Ian Kershaw argued that the primary reasons for the decision to remilitarize in 1936 as opposed to 1937 were Hitler's preference for dramatic unilateral coups to obtain what could easily be achieved via quiet talks, and Hitler's need for a foreign policy triumph to distract public attention from the major economic crisis that was gripping Germany in 1935--36 . </P> <P> During a meeting between Prince Bernhard von Bülow, the State Secretary at the Auswärtiges Amt (who is not to be confused with his more famous uncle Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow) and the French Ambassador André François - Poncet on 13 January 1936, where Bülow handed François - Poncet yet another note protesting against the Franco - Soviet pact, François - Poncet accused Bülow to his face of seeking any excuse, no matter how bizarre, strange or implausible to send troops back into the Rhineland . On 15 January 1936, a top - secret NKVD report was sent to Joseph Stalin entitled "Summary of Military and Political Intelligence on Germany", which reported--based on statements from various diplomats in the Auswärtiges Amt--that Germany was planning on remilitarizing the Rhineland in the near - future . The same summary quoted Bülow as saying that if Britain and France made any sort of agreement concerning military co-operation that did not involve Germany: "We would view this as a violation of Locarno, and if we are not dragged into participating in negotiations, we will not consider ourselves bound by Locarno obligations concerning the preservation of the Rhine demilitarized zone". The Soviet report warning of German plans for remilitarization was not passed on to either the British or French governments . </P>

Who defied the treaty of versailles by sending troops into the rhineland