<P> That seems to me to be the principle which lies at the bottom of the acceptance cases, of which two instances are the well - known judgment of Mellish, LJ, in Harris's Case, and the very instructive judgment of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v Metropolitan Ry Co, in which he appears to me to take exactly the line I have indicated . </P> <P> Now, if that is the law, how are we to find out whether the person who makes the offer does intimate that notification of acceptance will not be necessary in order to constitute a binding bargain? In many cases you look to the offer itself . In many cases you extract from the character of the transaction that notification is not required, and in the advertisement cases it seems to me to follow as an inference to be drawn from the transaction itself that a person is not to notify his acceptance of the offer before he performs the condition, but that if he performs the condition notification is dispensed with . It seems to me that from the point of view of common sense no other idea could be entertained . If I advertise to the world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings the dog to a particular place will be paid some money, are all the police or other persons whose business it is to find lost dogs to be expected to sit down and write me a note saying that they have accepted my proposal? Why, of course, they at once look after the dog, and as soon as they find the dog they have performed the condition . The essence of the transaction is that the dog should be found, and it is not necessary under such circumstances, as it seems to me, that in order to make the contract binding there should be any notification of acceptance . It follows from the nature of the thing that the performance of the condition is sufficient acceptance without the notification of it, and a person who makes an offer in an advertisement of that kind makes an offer which must be read by the light of that common sense reflection . He does, therefore, in his offer impliedly indicate that he does not require notification of the acceptance of the offer . </P> <P> A further argument for the defendants was that this was a nudum pactum - that there was no consideration for the promise--that taking the influenza was only a condition, and that the using the smoke ball was only a condition, and that there was no consideration at all; in fact, that there was no request, express or implied, to use the smoke ball . Now, I will not enter into an elaborate discussion upon the law as to requests in this kind of contracts . I will simply refer to Victors v Davies and Serjeant Manning's note to Fisher v Pyne, which everybody ought to read who wishes to embark in this controversy . The short answer, to abstain from academical discussion, is, it seems to me, that there is here a request to use involved in the offer . Then as to the alleged want of consideration . The definition of "consideration" given in Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 8th ed. p. 47, which is cited and adopted by Tindal CJ, in the case of Laythoarp v Bryant, is this: </P> <P> "Any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant derives a benefit or advantage, or any labour, detriment, or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff, provided such act is performed or such inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff, with the consent, either express or implied, of the defendant ." </P>

Carlill v. carbolic smoke ball co. case brief