<Li> "In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage ." Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P. 2d 783, 787--88 (Alaska 1996). </Li> <P> However, most legal texts have some lingering ambiguity--inevitably, situations arise in which the words chosen by the legislature do not address the precise facts in issue, or there is some tension among two or more statutes . In such cases, a court must analyze the various available sources, and reach a resolution of the ambiguity . The "Canons of statutory construction" are discussed in a separate article . Once the ambiguity is resolved, that resolution has binding effect as described in the rest of this article . </P> <P> Although inferior courts are bound in theory by superior court precedent, in practice a judge may believe that justice requires an outcome at some variance with precedent, and may distinguish the facts of the individual case on reasoning that does not appear in the binding precedent . On appeal, the appellate court may either adopt the new reasoning, or reverse on the basis of precedent . On the other hand, if the losing party does not appeal (typically because of the cost of the appeal), the lower court decision may remain in effect, at least as to the individual parties . </P> <P> Occasionally, a lower court judge explicitly states personal disagreement with the judgment he or she has rendered, but that he or she is required to do so by binding precedent . Note that inferior courts cannot evade binding precedent of superior courts, but a court can depart from its own prior decisions . </P>

Maxim doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere