<P> Guderian summarised combined - arms tactics as the way to get the mobile and motorised armoured divisions to work together and support each other to achieve decisive success . In his book, Panzer Leader, he wrote: </P> <P> In this year, 1929, I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance . My historical studies, the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock - ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance . In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons beings subordinated to the requirements of the armour . It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions; what was needed were armoured divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to allow the tanks to fight with full effect . </P> <P> Guderian believed that developments in technology were required to support the theory; especially, equipping armoured divisions--tanks foremost--with wireless communications . Guderian insisted in 1933 to the high command that every tank in the German armoured force must be equipped with a radio . At the start of the war, only the German army was thus prepared with all tanks "radio equipped". This proved critical in early tank battles where German tank commanders exploited the organizational advantage over the Allies that radio communication gave them . Later all Allied armies would copy this innovation . During the Polish campaign, the performance of armoured troops, under the influence of Guderian's ideas, won over a number of skeptics who had initially expressed doubt about armoured warfare, such as von Rundstedt and Rommel . </P> <P> According to David A. Grossman, by the 12th Battle of Isonzo, while conducting a light infantry operation, Rommel had perfected his maneuver warfare principles, which were the very same ones that were applied during the Blitzkrieg against France in 1940 (and repeated by the Allied grounded offensive against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War) During the Battle of France, Hitler caused a confusion when he suddenly changed his ideas and ordered that everything should be completed in a few weeks (his original plan would have taken years to be completed), encouraging Rommel and Guderian to disobey their direct superiors' orders by forging ahead and, on the way, invented the idea of Blitzkrieg . It was Rommel who created the first archetype of Blitzkrieg, leading his division far ahead of flanking divisions . MacGregor and Williamson remark that Rommel's version of Blitzkrieg displayed a significantly better understanding of combined - arms warfare than that of Guderian . General Hoth submitted an official report which declared that Rommel had "explored new paths in the command of Panzer divisions ." </P>

How did advancements in technology make blitzkrieg possible during world war ii