<P> Historians writing without benefit of access to the French archives (which were not opened until the mid-1970s) such as William L. Shirer in his books The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960) and The Collapse of the Third Republic (1969) have claimed that France, although possessing at this time superior armed forces compared to Germany, including after a possible mobilization 100 infantry divisions, was psychologically unprepared to use force against Germany . Shirer quoted the figure of France having 100 divisions compared to Germany's 19 battalions in the Rhineland . France's actions during the Rhineland crisis have often used as support of the décadence thesis that during the interwar period the supposed decadence of the French way of life caused the French people to degenerate physically and morally to the point that the French were simply unable to stand up to Hitler, and the French in some way had it coming when they were defeated in 1940 . Shirer wrote that the French could have easily turned back the German battalions in the Rhineland had the French people not been "sinking into defeatism" in 1936 . Historians such as the American historian Stephen A. Schuker who have examined the relevant French primary sources have rejected Shirer's claims as the work of an amateur historian writing without access to the primary sources, and have found that a major paralyzing factor on French policy was the economic situation as opposed to Shirer's claim that the French were just too cowardly to stand up to Hitler . France's top military official, General Maurice Gamelin, informed the French government that the only way to remove the Germans from the Rhineland was to mobilize the French Army, which would not only be unpopular, it would also cost the French treasury 30 million francs per day . Gamelin assumed a worst - case scenario in which a French move into the Rhineland would spark an all - out Franco - German war, a case which required full mobilization . Gamelin's analysis was supported by the War Minister, General Louis Maurin who told the Cabinet that it was inconceivable that France could reverse the German remilitarization without full mobilization . This was especially the case as the Deuxième Bureau had seriously exaggerated the number of German troops in the Rhineland, sending in a report to the French cabinet estimating that there were 295,000 German troops in the Rhineland . The Deuxième Bureau had come up with this estimate by counting all of the SS, SA and Landespolizei formations in the Rhineland as regular troops, and so the French believed only by full mobilization would France have enough troops to expel the alleged 295,000 German troops from the Rhineland . The real number was actually 3,000 German soldiers . The French historian Jean - Baptiste Duroselle accused Gamelin of distorting what the Deuxième Bureau's intelligence in his report to the cabinet by converting the SS, SA and Landespolizei units into fully trained troops to provide a reason for inaction . Neurath's (truthful) statement that Germany had only sent 19 battalions into the Rhineland was dismissed by Gamelin as a ruse to allow Germans to claim that they not committed a "flagrant violation" of Locarno in order to avoid having Locarno invoked against Germany, and that Hitler would never risk a war by sending such a small force into the Rhineland . </P> <P> At the same time, in late 1935 - early 1936 France was gripped by a financial crisis, with the French Treasury informing the government that sufficient cash reserves to maintain the value of the franc as currently pegged by the gold standard in regard to the U.S. dollar and the British pound no longer existed, and only a huge foreign loan on the money markets of London and New York could prevent the value of the franc from experiencing a disastrous downfall . Because France was on the verge of elections scheduled for the spring of 1936, devaluation of the franc, which was viewed as abhorrent by large sections of French public opinion, was rejected by the caretaker government of Premier Albert Sarraut as politically unacceptable . Investor fears of a war with Germany were not conducive to raising the necessary loans to stabilize the franc: the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, by sparking fears of war, worsened the French economic crisis by causing a massive cash flow out of France as worried investors shifted their savings towards what were felt to be safer foreign markets . The fact that France had defaulted on its World War I debts in 1932 understandably led most investors to conclude if France should be involved in another war with Germany, the French would default again on their debts . On March 18, 1936 Wilfrid Baumgartner, the director of the Mouvement général des fonds (the French equivalent of a permanent under - secretary) reported to the government that France for all intents and purposes was bankrupt . Only by desperate arm - twisting from the major French financial institutions did Baumgartner manage to obtain enough in the way of short - term loans to prevent France from defaulting on her debts and keeping the value of the franc from sliding too far, in March 1936 . Given the financial crisis, the French government feared that there were insufficient funds to cover the costs of mobilization, and that a full - blown war scare caused by mobilization would only exacerbate the financial crisis . The American historian Zach Shore wrote that: "It was not lack of French will to fight in 1936 which permitted Hitler's coup, but rather France's lack of funds, military might, and therefore operational plans to counter German remilitarization ." </P> <P> An additional issue for the French was the state of the Armée de l'Air . The Deuxième Bureau reported that not only had the Luftwaffe developed considerably more advanced aircraft than what France possessed, but owing to the superior productivity of German industry and the considerably larger size of the German economy the Luftwaffe had a three to one advantage in fighters . Problems with productivity within the French aircraft industry meant the French air force would have a great deal of trouble replacing their losses in the event of combat with the Luftwaffe . Thus, it was believed by the French military elite that should war come, then the Luftwaffe would dominate the skies, and not only attack French troops marching into the Rhineland, but bomb French cities . Yet another problem for the French were the attitudes of the states of the cordon sanitaire . Since 1919, it had accepted that France needed the alliance system in Eastern Europe to provide additional manpower (Germany's population was one and half times the size of France's) and to open up an eastern front against the Reich . Without the states of the cordon sanitaire, it was believed impossible for France to defeat Germany . Only Czechoslovakia indicated firmly that it would go to war with Germany if France marched into the Rhineland while Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia all indicated that they would only to go to war if German soldiers entered France . French public opinion and newspapers were very hostile towards the German coup, but few called for war . The majority of the French newspapers called for League of Nations sanctions to be imposed on the Reich to inflict such economically crippling costs as to force the German Army out of the Rhineland, and for France to build new and reinforce the existing alliances with the aim of preventing further German challenges to the international status quo . One of the few newspapers to support Germany was the royalist L'Action Française which ran a banner headline reading: "The Republic Has Assassinated the Peace!", and went on to say that the German move was justified by the Franco - Soviet pact . On the other ideological extreme, the Communists issued a statement calling for national unity against "those who would lead us to carnage" who were the "Laval clique" who were allegedly pushing for a war with Germany because war was supposedly good for capitalism . </P> <P> Upon hearing of the German move, the French government issued a statement strongly hinting that military action was a possible option . From 9: 30 am until noon on 7 March, a meeting of the French cabinet took place to discuss what to do which ended with the conclusion that the French Foreign Minister, Pierre Étienne Flandin should meet the ambassadors of the Locarno powers to discuss their reaction . Georges Mandel was the sole voice in the French cabinet demanding that France should march at once into the Rhineland to expel the German troops, regardless of the costs . Later that day, another cabinet meeting was called with General - Secretary Alexis St. Leger representing the Quai d'Orsay and Maurice Gamelin the military, who decided to issue the statement saying France reserved every option to oppose the remilitarization . Flandin upon hearing of the remilitarization immediately went to London to consult the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, as Flandin wished, for domestic political reasons, to find a way of shifting the onus of not taking action onto British shoulders . Baldwin asked Flandin what the French Government had in mind but Flandin said they had not yet decided . Flandin went back to Paris and consulted the French Government what their response should be . They agreed that "France would place all her forces at the disposal of the League of Nations to oppose a violation of the Treaties". On 8 March, the Premier Albert Sarraut went on French radio to state: "In the name of the French government, I declare that we intend to see maintained that essential guarantee of French and Belgian security, countersigned by the English and Italian governments, constituted by the Treaty of Locarno . We are not disposed to allow Strasbourg to come under fire from German guns". At the same time, the French cabinet had decided that: "We will put all our forces, material and moral, at the disposal of the League of Nations...on the one condition that we shall be accompanied in the fight for peace by those who are clearly bound themselves to do so by the Rhineland pact". In other words, France would act against Germany only if Britain and Italy acted likewise . </P>

What was the stand of france and britain about the reunification