<Li> Cavalry Corps, under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, including the divisions of Maj . Gens . Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee . </Li> <P> On May 4, 1864, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River at three separate points and converged on the Wilderness Tavern, near the edge of the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, an area of more than 70 sq mi (181 km) of Spotsylvania County and Orange County in central Virginia . Early settlers in the area had cut down the native forests to fuel blast furnaces that processed the iron ore found there, leaving only a secondary growth of dense shrubs . This rough terrain, which was virtually unsettled, was nearly impenetrable to 19th - century infantry and artillery maneuvers . A number of battles were fought in the vicinity between 1862 and 1864, including the bloody Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863 . The Wilderness had been the concentration point for the Confederates one year earlier when Stonewall Jackson launched his devastating attack on the Union right flank at Chancellorsville . But Grant chose to set up his camps to the west of the old battle site before moving southward; unlike the Union army of a year before, Grant had no desire to fight in the Wilderness, preferring to move to the open ground to the south and east of the Wilderness before fighting Lee, thereby taking advantage of his superior numbers and artillery . </P> <P> Grant's plan was for the V Corps (Warren) and VI Corps (Sedgwick) to cross the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, followed by the IX Corps (Burnside) after the supply trains had crossed at various fords, and to camp near Wilderness Tavern . The II Corps (Hancock) would cross to the east on Ely's Ford and advance to Spotsylvania Court House by way of Chancellorsville and Todd's Tavern . Speed was of the essence to the plan because the army was vulnerably stretched thin as it moved . Although Grant insisted that the army travel light with minimal artillery and supplies, its logistical "tail" was almost 70 miles . Sylvanus Cadwallader, a journalist with the Army of the Potomac, estimated that Meade's supply trains alone--which included 4,300 wagons, 835 ambulances, and a herd of cattle for slaughter--if using a single road would reach from the Rapidan to below Richmond . Grant gambled that Meade could move his army quickly enough to avoid being ensnared in the Wilderness, but Meade recommended that they camp overnight to allow the wagon train to catch up . Grant also miscalculated when he assumed that Lee was incapable of intercepting the Union army at its most vulnerable point, and Meade had not provided adequate cavalry coverage to warn of a Confederate movement from the west . </P> <P> On May 2, Lee met with his generals on Clark Mountain, obtaining a panoramic view of the enemy camps . He realized that Grant was getting ready to attack, but did not know the precise route of advance . He correctly predicted that Grant would cross to the east of the Confederate fortifications on the Rapidan, using the Germanna and Ely Fords, but he could not be certain . To retain flexibility of response, Lee had dispersed his Army over a wide area . Longstreet's First Corps was around Gordonsville, from where they had the flexibility to respond by railroad to potential threats to the Shenandoah Valley or to Richmond . Lee's headquarters and Hill's Third Corps were outside Orange Court House . Ewell's Second Corps was the closest to the Wilderness, at Morton's Ford . </P>

Who won the battle of wilderness in the civil war