<P> The commerce clause provides comprehensive powers to the United States over navigable waters . These powers are critical to understanding the rights of landowners adjoining or exercising what would otherwise be riparian rights under the common law . The Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters . "The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States...For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress ." United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). The Rands decision continues: </P> <P> This power to regulate navigation confers upon the United States a dominant servitude, FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954), which extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below ordinary high - water mark . The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been subject . United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596--597 (1941); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275--276 (1897). Thus, without being constitutionally obligated to pay compensation, the United States may change the course of a navigable stream, South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876), or otherwise impair or destroy a riparian owner's access to navigable waters, Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945), even though the market value of the riparian owner's land is substantially diminished . </P> <P> Other scholars, such as Robert H. Bork and Daniel E. Troy, argue that prior to 1887, the Commerce Clause was rarely invoked by Congress, and thus a broad interpretation of the word "commerce" was clearly never intended by the Founders . In support of this claim, they argue that the word "commerce", as used in the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers, can be substituted with either "trade" or "exchange" interchangeably while preserving the meaning of the statements . They also point to Madison's statement in an 1828 letter that the "Constitution vests in Congress expressly ...' the power to regulate trade' ." </P> <P> Examining contemporaneous dictionaries does not neatly resolve the matter . For instance, the 1792 edition of Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language defines the noun "commerce" narrowly as "(e) xchange of one thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick", but it defines the corresponding verb "to commerce" more broadly as "(t) o hold intercourse ." The word "intercourse" also had a different and wider meaning back in 1792 than it does now . </P>

How does the commerce clause affect state and national power