<P> The British leadership soon discovered it had overestimated the capabilities of its own troops, while underestimating those of the colonists, causing a sudden re-think in British planning . The ineffective initial response of British military and civil officials to the onset of the rebellion had allowed the advantage to shift to the colonists, as British authorities rapidly lost control over every colony . A microcosm of these shortcomings were evident at the Battle of Bunker Hill . It took ten hours for the British leadership to respond following the sighting of the Americans on the Charlestown Peninsula, giving the colonists ample time to reinforce their defenses . Rather than opt for a simple flanking attack that would have rapidly succeeded with minimal loss, the British decided on repeated frontal attacks . The results were telling; the British suffered 1,054 casualties of a force of around 3,000 after repeated frontal assaults . The British leadership had nevertheless remained excessively optimistic, believing that just two regiments could suppress the rebellion in Massachusetts . </P> <P> Debate persists over whether a British defeat was a guaranteed outcome . Ferling argues that the odds were so long, the defeat of Britain was nothing short of a miracle . Ellis, however, considers that the odds always favored the Americans, and questions whether a British victory by any margin was realistic . Ellis argues that the British squandered their only opportunities for a decisive success in 1777, and that the strategic decisions undertaken by William Howe underestimated the challenges posed by the Americans . Ellis concludes that, once Howe failed, the opportunity for a British victory "would never come again". Conversely, the United States Army's official textbook argues that, had Britain been able to commit 10,000 fresh troops to the war in 1780, a British victory was within the realms of possibility . </P> <P> Historians such as Ellis and Stewart have observed that, under William Howe's command, the British squandered several opportunities to achieve a decisive victory over the Americans . Throughout the New York and Philadelphia campaigns, Howe made several strategic errors, errors which cost the British opportunities for a complete victory . At Long Island, Howe failed to even attempt an encirclement of Washington, and actively restrained his subordinates from mounting an aggressive pursuit of the defeated American army . At White Plains, he refused to engage Washington's vulnerable army, and instead concentrated his efforts upon a hill which offered the British no strategic advantage . After securing control of New York, Howe dispatched Henry Clinton to capture Newport, a measure which Clinton was opposed to, on the grounds the troops assigned to his command could have been put to better use in pursuing Washington's retreating army . Despite the bleak outlook for the revolutionary cause and the surge of Loyalist activity in the wake of Washington's defeats, Howe made no attempt to mount an attack upon Washington while the Americans settled down into winter quarters, much to their surprise . </P> <P> During planning for the Saratoga campaign, Howe was left with the choice of committing his army to support Burgoyne, or capture Philadelphia, the revolutionary capital . Howe decided upon the latter, determining that Washington was of a greater threat . The decision left Burgoyne precariously isolated, and left the Americans confounded at the decision . Alden argues Howe may have been motivated by political opportunism; if Burgoyne was successful, he would receive the credit for a decisive victory, and not Howe . However, the confusion was further compounded by the lack of explicit and contradictory instructions from London . When Howe launched his campaign, he took his army upon a time - consuming route through the Chesapeake Bay, rather than the more sensible choices of overland through New Jersey, or by sea through the Delaware Bay . The move left him unable to assist Burgoyne even if it was required of him . The decision so confused Parliament, that Howe was accused by Tories on both sides of the Atlantic of treason . </P>

Where did the revolutionary war start and end