<P> In 2008, Harris described the success of the French and XIII Corps and XV Corps, the extent of British casualties for ground gained and Haig's responsibility for the British casualties . Harris wrote of the inferior German defences on the French front, surprise, superior French artillery and better infantry tactics than those used by the British . The French attacked in the south as did the two most successful British corps and in this area, only the first line was expected to be captured . Harris wrote that the German army was often ignored in analyses of the First Day and that the main defensive effort was made in the north, the area of greatest German success . Terrain in the south, Anglo - French air superiority and closer objectives, tended to concentrate Allied artillery - fire, which was better - observed and more accurate than on the hillier ground to the north . </P> <P> Barbed wire was cut, the German fortifications "exceptionally" damaged and a crude form of creeping barrage preceded the infantry to their objectives . Harris held Haig responsible for the extension of the objectives in the north to the German second position, which diluted the density of British artillery - fire, although because no study had been made of the details of the preliminary bombardment, caution must accompany a conclusion that bombardment of the closer objectives was unduly dissipated . Harris concluded that the attack front was too broad and that Rawlinson should be held responsible with Haig, for attempting to advance on a 16 mi (26 km) front . Despite being under no diplomatic pressure from the French or political pressure from London to obtain swift success, the British tried to do too much too quickly, unlike the French Sixth Army which made short advances with the support of massive amounts of artillery - fire . </P> <P> Philpott wrote that after the war the French Official History gave five pages to 1 July, with one paragraph on the British attack and that the German Official History Der Weltkrieg covered the day in 62 pages . The British Official History described the day in 177 pages, with one page on the French success . In Joffre's memoirs the French victory was ascribed to "the excellent work of the artillery" and German underestimation of French offensive potential remaining from the battle at Verdun, leading them to make their principal defensive effort in the north . The British had been attacked from behind after failing to mop up captured German positions . This military explanation was insufficient for many British commentators, who blamed "anachronistic" "sword wavers" for leading volunteers to an unnecessary slaughter . The French success, based on the experience of 1915 was overlooked, as was the French expectation of more quick victories being disappointed, as the battle became a counterpart to the long attrition campaign at Verdun . Philpott also described the Germans being written out of the British narrative of useless sacrifice . The Anglo - French armies had gained an advantage on 1 July, by forcing the German defences for 13 mi (21 km) either side of the Somme to collapse . In the early afternoon a broad breach existed north of the river but the "break in" was in an unexpected place, which meant that exploitation would have to be improvised . </P> <P> Philpott wrote that the "gory scene" behind the British front showed that something had gone wrong . In the evening of 1 July, Haig wrote in his diary, </P>

Who won the battle of somme on the first day