<P> Some mixed systems, such as Scots law in Scotland, South - African law, and the law of Quebec and Louisiana, do not fit into the civil vs. common law dichotomy because they mix portions of both . Such systems may have been heavily influenced by the common law tradition; however, their private law is firmly rooted in the civil law tradition . Because of their position between the two main systems of law, these types of legal systems are sometimes referred to as "mixed" systems of law . Louisiana courts, for instance, operate under both stare decisis and jurisprudence constante . In South Africa, the precedent of higher courts is absolutely or fully binding on lower courts, whereas the precedent of lower courts only has persuasive authority on higher courts; horizontally, precedent is prima facie or presumptively binding between courts . </P> <P> Law professors in common law traditions play a much smaller role in developing case law than professors in civil law traditions . Because court decisions in civil law traditions are brief and not amenable to establishing precedent, much of the exposition of the law in civil law traditions is done by academics rather than by judges; this is called doctrine and may be published in treatises or in journals such as Recueil Dalloz in France . Historically, common law courts relied little on legal scholarship; thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, it was very rare to see an academic writer quoted in a legal decision (except perhaps for the academic writings of prominent judges such as Coke and Blackstone). Today academic writers are often cited in legal argument and decisions as persuasive authority; often, they are cited when judges are attempting to implement reasoning that other courts have not yet adopted, or when the judge believes the academic's restatement of the law is more compelling than can be found in precedent . Thus common law systems are adopting one of the approaches long common in civil law jurisdictions . </P> <P> Justice Louis Brandeis, in a heavily footnoted dissent to Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 - 411 (1932), explained (citations and quotations omitted): </P> <Dl> <Dd> Stare decisis is not...a universal, inexorable command . "The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible . Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided ." Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation . But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions . The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function...In cases involving the Federal Constitution the position of this Court is unlike that of the highest court of England, where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is strictly applied to all classes of cases . Parliament is free to correct any judicial error; and the remedy may be promptly invoked . </Dd> </Dl>

What is doctrine of precedent in english law