<P> The Court first considered the question of whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protected non-speech acts, since Johnson was convicted of flag desecration rather than verbal communication, and, if so, whether Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, which would permit him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction . </P> <P> The First Amendment specifically disallows the abridgment of "speech," but the court reiterated its long recognition that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word . This was concluded based on the 1931 case Stromberg v. California (283 U.S. 359) which ruled the display of a red flag as speech, and the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (393 U.S. 503), which ruled the wearing of a black armband as speech . </P> <P> The Court rejected "the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled' speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea," but acknowledged that conduct may be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments ." In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, the court asked whether "an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and (whether) the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it ." </P> <P> The Court found that, "Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment...Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent ." The court concluded that, while "the government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word," it may not "proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements ." </P>

Who wrote the dissenting opinion in texas v johnson