<P> Philosophy of science looks at the underpinning logic of the scientific method, at what separates science from non-science, and the ethic that is implicit in science . There are basic assumptions, derived from philosophy by at least one prominent scientist, that form the base of the scientific method--namely, that reality is objective and consistent, that humans have the capacity to perceive reality accurately, and that rational explanations exist for elements of the real world . These assumptions from methodological naturalism form a basis on which science may be grounded . Logical Positivist, empiricist, falsificationist, and other theories have criticized these assumptions and given alternative accounts of the logic of science, but each has also itself been criticized . More generally, the scientific method can be recognized as an idealization . </P> <P> Thomas Kuhn examined the history of science in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and found that the actual method used by scientists differed dramatically from the then - espoused method . His observations of science practice are essentially sociological and do not speak to how science is or can be practiced in other times and other cultures . </P> <P> Norwood Russell Hanson, Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn have done extensive work on the "theory laden" character of observation . Hanson (1958) first coined the term for the idea that all observation is dependent on the conceptual framework of the observer, using the concept of gestalt to show how preconceptions can affect both observation and description . He opens Chapter 1 with a discussion of the Golgi bodies and their initial rejection as an artefact of staining technique, and a discussion of Brahe and Kepler observing the dawn and seeing a "different" sun rise despite the same physiological phenomenon . Kuhn and Feyerabend acknowledge the pioneering significance of his work . </P> <P> Kuhn (1961) said the scientist generally has a theory in mind before designing and undertaking experiments so as to make empirical observations, and that the "route from theory to measurement can almost never be traveled backward". This implies that the way in which theory is tested is dictated by the nature of the theory itself, which led Kuhn (1961, p. 166) to argue that "once it has been adopted by a profession...no theory is recognized to be testable by any quantitative tests that it has not already passed". </P>

The first step in the scientific method is developing a method