<P> Three Indian corps were involved in the liberation of East Pakistan . They were supported by nearly three brigades of Mukti Bahini fighting alongside them, and many more fighting irregularly . This was far superior to the Pakistani army of three divisions . The Indians quickly overran the country, selectively engaging or bypassing heavily defended strongholds . Pakistani forces were unable to effectively counter the Indian attack, as they had been deployed in small units around the border to counter guerrilla attacks by the Mukti Bahini . Unable to defend Dacca, the Pakistanis surrendered on 16 December 1971 . </P> <P> The debate of Indian involvement in this war has been a source of tension and underlying conflict between India and Bangladesh since the emergence of the war itself . This section examines the role of India in this war by exploring the ways in which India largely contributed to the war and to what extent this aided the Bangladeshis . In exploring the latter, one can see that there are several ways in which India aided Bangladesh . For one, India was largely responsible for building the Mukti Bahini from a group of inexperienced rebel fighters to an army formidable enough to fight against the Pakistani army . When the war first broke out it in 1971, the initial state of the Bengali rebels can be understood from the remark of one Bengali rebel officer, who complained that "No one in the Bangladesh cabinet knows anything about war". This construed the dire situation of the army before India's intervention . The Mukti Bahini was recounted as being "Without any supplies or assistance". If a weapon became unserviceable the soldier carrying that weapon became useless, since he could not be given another weapon . There was a complete dearth of a "Modern communication system to be in constant touch with troops in different battle locations". This is evidenced in that the Mukti Bahini's position was threatened at Kumira, but the army had received the message three hours late because of the poor communication system . Indira Gandhi's government escalated its backing for the Bengali uprising from July 1970 onwards . Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India at the time, when asked if India stimulated the Liberation War, had candidly said that "If you want to go way back, we helped the Mukti Bahini . So, if you consider it all as beginning with that aid and from that moment, yes - we were the ones to start it ." As the war progressed, the involvement of the Indian Army in this war intensified and with each stage improved Mukti Bahini . Initially, the Indian army was directly ordered to help the Mukti Bahini, involving India's top generals This is evident in the Indian army's training and sponsoring of the Bengali rebels who comprised Mukti Bahini, which was badly outnumbered, many bearing only knives and hand grenades, reluctant to attack Pakistani army units . Even the better - armed insurgents were outmatched by Pakistan's artillery and air force . Durga Prasad Dhar, confidant of Indira Gandhi who was a chief architect of the Indian intervention in the war, aided Bengali exiles in London to purchase weapons in Belgium and ship them to the guerrillas in East Pakistan . The Indian Army was thoroughly enmeshed in the guerilla warfare, as shown by a report to Indira Gandhi's government from an Indian team touring the border states of Assam and Tripura in the early 1970s . Furthermore, India's Border Security Force provided cover when the Bengali rebels attacked towns of Pakistan army positions . Under fire, the guerrillas relied on India's force to provide support or re-supply them with ammunition . The Bengalis, in desperation, used children as soldiers - these children were untrained and inexperienced . However, under the eye of the Indian army, these child soldiers were taken for special and regular military training, and the Indian government planned youth training, consisting of political indoctrination and guerilla warfare . Many of the youth camps were run by India's Border Security Force, with the military training given by the Indian army . To fight an effective riverine campaign, the rebels--accustomed to their homeland of marshes and water - wars, needed to be taught about camouflage and crawling . </P> <P> This is where the debate comes in . On the other side of the argument there is evidence that shows this aid may have not been as adequate as many historians believe . The rebels were simply not getting enough . Furthermore, the guerillas, often fighting with weapons captured from Pakistan desperately wanted more arms and ammunition from India . The rebel officers pleaded for heavy artillery, anti-aircraft rounds, and anti-tank grenades . They required Rifles, mortars, walkie - talkies, field telephone sets, maps, medical kits, binoculars, etc . However,' India seemed more worried about the embarrassment that would inevitably follow when Indian weapons were captured during the fighting and thus was hesitant in expediting the deployment of arms to the rebels . </P> <P> The Bengali rebels also questioned Indian supervision . India was unaware and unprepared of the Bangladeshi situation . </P>

Who headed indian army in bangladesh liberation war in 1971