<P> In the description of the structure called "normal," "normative," "central," "ideal," this possibility must be integrated as an essential possibility . The possibility cannot be treated as though it were a simple accident - marginal or parasitic . It cannot be, and hence ought not to be, and this passage from can to ought reflects the entire difficulty . In the analysis of so - called normal cases, one neither can nor ought, in all theoretical rigor, to exclude the possibility of transgression . Not even provisionally, or out of allegedly methodological considerations . It would be a poor method, since this possibility of transgression tells us immediately and indispensably about the structure of the act said to be normal as well as about the structure of law in general . </P> <P> Derrida argued that it was problematic to establish the relation between "nonfiction or standard discourse" and "fiction," defined as its "parasite, "for part of the most originary essence of the latter is to allow fiction, the simulacrum, parasitism, to take place--and in so doing to "de-essentialize" itself as it were ". He would finally argue that the indispensable question would then become: </P> <P> what is "nonfiction standard discourse," what must it be and what does this name evoke, once its fictionality or its fictionalization, its transgressive "parasitism," is always possible (and moreover by virtue of the very same words, the same phrases, the same grammar, etc .)? </P> <P> This question is all the more indispensable since the rules, and even the statements of the rules governing the relations of "nonfiction standard discourse" and its fictional "parasites," are not things found in nature, but laws, symbolic inventions, or conventions, institutions that, in their very normality as well as in their normativity, entail something of the fictional . </P>

Who first advocated the concept of deconstruction in sociology