<P> Despite considerable debate among German staff officers, General Erich von Falkenhayn, the head of Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, German army supreme command) insisted on rigid defence of the front line in 1916 and implied after the war that the psychology of German soldiers, shortage of manpower and lack of reserves made the policy inescapable, since the troops necessary to seal off breakthroughs did not exist . High losses incurred in holding ground by a policy of no retreat were preferable to higher losses, voluntary withdrawals and the effect of a belief that soldiers had discretion to avoid battle . When a more flexible policy was substituted later, discretion was still reserved to army commanders . Despite the certainty by mid-June of an Anglo - French attack on the Somme against the 2nd Army, Falkenhayn sent only four divisions, keeping eight in the western strategic reserve . No divisions were moved from the 6th Army, despite it holding a shorter line with ​ 17 ⁄ divisions and three of the reserve divisions being in the 6th Army area . The maintenance of the strength of the 6th Army at the expense of the 2nd Army on the Somme, indicated that Falkenhayn intended a counter-offensive against the British to be made closer to Arras north of the Somme front, once the British offensive had been shattered . </P> <P> In April 1916, Groupe d'armées du Nord (GAN, General Ferdinand Foch) issued an 82 - page pamphlet on the stages and processes of an attack on enemy positions prepared in depth, which the offensives of 1915 showed would inevitably be costly and time - consuming . The pamphlet was a substantial revision of Note 5779, derived from But et conditions d'une action offensive d'ensemble (16 April 1915), a manual compiled from after - action reports of the fighting in 1914 and the foundation of French offensive planning during 1915 . The pamphlet revised the emphasis in Note 5779 on breakthrough offensives; a battle would now be methodical until the power of resistance of the defender was broken by "moral, material and physical degradation", while the attacker retained the ability to continue the offensive; a breakthrough remained a possibility but would be unlikely . Co-ordination of artillery and infantry was fundamental to the process, in which artillery would destroy defences and then infantry would occupy them, infantry objectives being determined by the capacity of artillery to prepare the way and limit casualties . </P> <P> Artillery bombardments were to be co-ordinated with infantry attacks, with various types of artillery given suitable targets for the cumulative destruction of field defences and the killing of German infantry . Heavy artillery and mortars were to be used for the destruction of field fortifications, howitzers and light mortars for the destruction of trenches, machine - gun and observation posts; heavy guns and mortars to destroy fortified villages and concrete strong points . Longer - range guns were to engage German artillery with counter-battery fire, to deprive German infantry of artillery support during the attack, when French infantry were at their most vulnerable . Wire cutting was to be performed by field artillery, firing high explosive (HE) shells and supported by specialist wire - cutting sections of infantry, which would go out the night before an attack . During the attack, the field artillery would fire a linear barrage on trenches and the edges of woods and villages . Infantry tactics were to be based on reconnaissance, clear objectives, liaison with flanking units and the avoidance of disorganisation within attacking units . General attacks would need to be followed by the systematic capture of remaining defences for jumping - off positions in the next general attack . </P> <P> In 1915, British tactical thinking had been based on the experience of its Western Front battles, particularly the Battle of Loos in September and the study of French and German experience in translated manuals and pamphlets . The importance of organised artillery firepower and the integration of types of weapons and equipment was understood by the British planners . Creeping barrages, smoke screens and cloud gas discharges were to be used along with aircraft, trench mortars, Lewis guns and elaborate signals systems, to counter chronic communication failures as soon as the infantry attacked . Troops were to advance in a succession of lines grouped into waves, followed by parties to consolidate captured ground or pass through the leading troops and continue the advance . The 9th Division had attacked at Loos with four battalions on a front of 1,600 yd (1,500 m), each battalion in three waves, one behind the other . A second battalion followed each of the leading battalions in the same formation, ready to leapfrog beyond and a second brigade followed the first as a reserve . Six lines of infantry, with the soldiers 2 yd (1.8 m) apart had confronted the German defence . Lines and waves had been made thinner and shallower after 1915 . On 14 July 1916, in the attack on Longueval, the 9th (Scottish) Division advanced with four battalions . Companies were arranged in columns of platoons, creating four platoon waves 70 yd (64 m) apart . One of the attacking brigades advanced with each battalion on a two - company front with two companies behind a second battalion following on . Each section of the front was attacked by sixteen platoon waves . Six platoons had attacked on a front of about 1,000 yd (910 m), roughly one soldier every 5.5 yd (5.0 m). </P>

Battle of the somme british casualties first day