<P> Now it is to be considered, that the preamble and introductory matter in the indictment--such as unlawfully and deceitfully designing and intending unjustly to extort great sums, &c.--is mere recital, and not traversable, and therefore cannot aid an imperfect averment of the facts constituting the description of the offence . The same may be said of the concluding matter, which follows the averment, as to the great damage and oppression not only of their said masters, employing them in said art and occupation, but also of divers other workmen in the same art, mystery and occupation, to the evil example, &c . If the facts averred constitute the crime, these are properly stated as the legal inferences to be drawn from them . If they do not constitute the charge of such an offence, they cannot be aided by these alleged consequences . </P> <P> Stripped then of these introductory recitals and alleged injurious consequences, and of the qualifying epithets attached to the facts, the averment is this; that the defendants and others formed themselves into a society, and agreed not to work for any person, who should employ any journeyman or other person, not a member of such society, after notice given him to discharge such workman . </P> <P> The manifest intent of the association is, to induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become members of it . Such a purpose is not unlawful . It would give them a power which might be exerted for useful and honorable purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones . If the latter were the real and actual object, and susceptible of proof, it should have been specially charged . Such an association might be used to afford each other assistance in times of poverty, sickness and distress; or to raise their intellectual, moral and social condition; or to make improvement in their art; or for other proper purposes . Or the association might be designed for purposes of oppression and injustice . But in order to charge all those, who become members of an association, with the guilt of a criminal conspiracy, it must be averred and proved that the actual, if not the avowed object of the association, was criminal . An association may be formed, the declared objects of which are innocent and laudable, and yet they may have secret articles, or an agreement communicated only to the members, by which they are banded together for purposes injurious to the peace of society or the rights of its members . Such would undoubtedly be a criminal conspiracy, on proof of the fact, however meritorious and praiseworthy the declared objects might be . The law is not to be hoodwinked by colorable pretences . It looks at truth and reality, through whatever disguise it may assume . But to make such an association, ostensibly innocent, the subject of prosecution as a criminal conspiracy, the secret agreement, which makes it so, is to be averred and proved as the gist of the offence . But when an association is formed for purposes actually innocent, and afterwards its powers are abused, by those who have the control and management of it, to purposes of oppression and injustice, it will be criminal in those who thus misuse it, or give consent thereto, but not in the other members of the association . In this case, no such secret agreement, varying the objects of the association from those avowed, is set forth in this count of the indictment . </P> <P> Nor can we perceive that the objects of this association, whatever they may have been, were to be attained by criminal means . The means which they proposed to employ, as averred in this count, and which, as we are now to presume, were established by the proof, were, that they would not work for a person, who, after due notice, should employ a journeyman not a member of their society . Supposing the object of the association to be laudable and lawful, or at least not unlawful, are these means criminal? The case supposes that these persons are not bound by contract, but free to work for whom they please, or not to work, if they so prefer . In this state of things, we cannot perceive, that it is criminal for men to agree together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own interests . One way to test this is, to consider the effect of such an agreement, where the object of the association is acknowledged on all hands to be a laudable one . Suppose a class of workmen, impressed with the manifold evils of intemperance, should agree with each other not to work in a shop in which ardent spirit was furnished, or not to work in a shop with any one who used it, or not to work for an employer, who should, after notice, employ a journeyman who habitually used it . The consequences might be the same . A workman, who should still persist in the use of ardent spirit, would find it more difficult to get employment; a master employing such a one might, at times, experience inconvenience in his work, in losing the services of a skilful but intemperate workman . Still it seems to us, that as the object would be lawful, and the means not unlawful, such an agreement could not be pronounced a criminal conspiracy . </P>

The massachusetts court case of commonwealth v hunt