<P> One example of the gradual change that typifies evolution of the common law is the gradual change in liability for negligence . The traditional common law rule through most of the 19th century was that a plaintiff could not recover for a defendant's negligent production or distribution of a harmful instrumentality unless the two were in privity of contract . Thus, only the immediate purchaser could recover for a product defect, and if a part was built up out of parts from parts manufacturers, the ultimate buyer could not recover for injury caused by a defect in the part . In an 1842 English case, Winterbottom v. Wright, the postal service had contracted with Wright to maintain its coaches . Winterbottom was a driver for the post . When the coach failed and injured Winterbottom, he sued Wright . The Winterbottom court recognized that there would be "absurd and outrageous consequences" if an injured person could sue any person peripherally involved, and knew it had to draw a line somewhere, a limit on the causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury . The court looked to the contractual relationships, and held that liability would only flow as far as the person in immediate contract ("privity") with the negligent party . </P> <P> A first exception to this rule arose in 1852, in the case of Thomas v. Winchester, when New York's highest court held that mislabeling a poison as an innocuous herb, and then selling the mislabeled poison through a dealer who would be expected to resell it, put "human life in imminent danger". Thomas relied on this reason to create an exception to the "privity" rule . In, 1909, New York held in Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co. that a coffee urn manufacturer was liable to a person injured when the urn exploded, because the urn "was of such a character inherently that, when applied to the purposes for which it was designed, it was liable to become a source of great danger to many people if not carefully and properly constructed". </P> <P> Yet the privity rule survived . In Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, (decided in 1915 by the federal appeals court for New York and several neighboring states), the court held that a car owner could not recover for injuries from a defective wheel, when the automobile owner had a contract only with the automobile dealer and not with the manufacturer, even though there was "no question that the wheel was made of dead and' dozy' wood, quite insufficient for its purposes ." The Cadillac court was willing to acknowledge that the case law supported exceptions for "an article dangerous in its nature or likely to become so in the course of the ordinary usage to be contemplated by the vendor". However, held the Cadillac court, "one who manufactures articles dangerous only if defectively made, or installed, e.g., tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors hung on the walls, carriages, automobiles, and so on, is not liable to third parties for injuries caused by them, except in case of willful injury or fraud," </P> <P> Finally, in the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in 1916, Judge Benjamin Cardozo for New York's highest court pulled a broader principle out of these predecessor cases . The facts were almost identical to Cadillac a year earlier: a wheel from a wheel manufacturer was sold to Buick, to a dealer, to MacPherson, and the wheel failed, injuring MacPherson . Judge Cardozo held: </P>

The body of judge made law that originated in england