<Dd> "It is clear from the passages you cite that Wittgenstein did not understand (the first incompleteness theorem) (or pretended not to understand it). He interpreted it as a kind of logical paradox, while in fact is just the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within an absolutely uncontroversial part of mathematics (finitary number theory or combinatorics)." (Wang 1996: 179) </Dd> <P> Since the publication of Wittgenstein's Nachlass in 2000, a series of papers in philosophy have sought to evaluate whether the original criticism of Wittgenstein's remarks was justified . Floyd and Putnam (2000) argue that Wittgenstein had a more complete understanding of the incompleteness theorem than was previously assumed . They are particularly concerned with the interpretation of a Gödel sentence for an ω - inconsistent system as actually saying "I am not provable", since the system has no models in which the provability predicate corresponds to actual provability . Rodych (2003) argues that their interpretation of Wittgenstein is not historically justified, while Bays (2004) argues against Floyd and Putnam's philosophical analysis of the provability predicate . Berto (2009) explores the relationship between Wittgenstein's writing and theories of paraconsistent logic . </P>

Systems theory is most closely related to which of the following statements