<P> In May 1950, one month before the appeals court heard oral arguments in the Dennis v. United States case, the Supreme Court ruled on free speech issues in American Communications Association v. Douds . In that case, the Court considered the clear and present danger test, but rejected it as too mechanical and instead introduced a balancing test . The federal appeals court heard oral arguments in the CPUSA case on June 21--23, 1950 . Judge Learned Hand considered the clear and present danger test, but his opinion adopted a balancing approach similar to that suggested in American Communications Association v. Douds . </P> <P> The defendants appealed the Second Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States . The 6--2 decision was issued on June 4, 1951, and upheld Hand's decision . Chief Justice Fred Vinson's opinion stated that the First Amendment does not require that the government must wait "until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited" before it interrupts seditious plots . In his opinion, Vinson endorsed the balancing approach used by Judge Hand: </P> <P> Chief Judge Learned Hand...interpreted the (clear and present danger) phrase as follows:' In each case, (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the "evil", discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger .' We adopt this statement of the rule . As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time . It takes into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their significances . More we cannot expect from words . </P> <P> Following Schenck v. United States, "clear and present danger" became both a public metaphor for First Amendment speech and a standard test in cases before the Court where a United States law limits a citizen's First Amendment rights; the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was replaced in 1969 by Brandenburg v. Ohio, and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an "imminent lawless action". </P>

The clear and present danger doctrine has been related to all of the following except