<P> Robert E. Wright argues in Corporation Nation (2014) that the governance of early U.S. corporations, of which over 20,000 existed by the Civil War of 1861 - 1865, was superior to that of corporations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries because early corporations governed themselves like "republics", replete with numerous "checks and balances" against fraud and against usurpation of power by managers or by large shareholders . (The term "robber baron" became particularly associated with US corporate figures in the Gilded Age - the late 19th century .) </P> <P> In the immediate aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 legal scholars such as Adolf Augustus Berle, Edwin Dodd, and Gardiner C. Means pondered on the changing role of the modern corporation in society . From the Chicago school of economics, Ronald Coase introduced the notion of transaction costs into the understanding of why firms are founded and how they continue to behave . </P> <P> US economic expansion through the emergence of multinational corporations after World War II (1939 - 1945) saw the establishment of the managerial class . Several Harvard Business School management professors studied and wrote about the new class: Myles Mace (entrepreneurship), Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (business history), Jay Lorsch (organizational behavior) and Elizabeth MacIver (organizational behavior). According to Lorsch and MacIver "many large corporations have dominant control over business affairs without sufficient accountability or monitoring by their board of directors". </P> <P> In the 1980s, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen established the principal--agent problem as a way of understanding corporate governance: the firm is seen as a series of contracts . </P>

The corporate charter of a firm includes all of the following information except