<P> On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon declared that if the major operations needed to neutralize North Vietnamese and NLF forces were to succeed, U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam would have to be increased from 120,000 to 400,000 . In a series of meetings between Westmoreland and the President held in Honolulu in February 1966, Westmoreland argued that the U.S. presence had succeeded in preventing the immediate defeat of the South Vietnamese government but that more troops would be necessary if systematic offensive operations were to be conducted . The issue then became in what manner American forces would be used . </P> <P> The nature of the American military's strategic and tactical decisions made during this period would color the conduct and nature of the conflict for the duration of the American commitment . Classical military logic demanded that the U.S. attack the locus of PAVN / NLF in the North . If that country could not be invaded, then the enemy's logistical system in Laos and Cambodia should be cut by ground forces, isolating the southern battlefield . However, political considerations limited U.S. military actions, mainly because of the memory of communist reactions during the Korean War . Ever present in the minds of diplomats, military officers, and politicians was the possibility of a spiraling escalation of the conflict into a superpower confrontation and the possibility of a nuclear exchange . Therefore, there would be no invasion of North Vietnam, the "neutrality" of Laos and Cambodia would be respected, and Rolling Thunder would not resemble the bombing of Germany and Japan during the Second World War . </P> <P> These limitations were not foisted upon the military as an afterthought . Before the first U.S. soldiers came ashore at Da Nang, the Pentagon was cognizant of all of the parameters that would be imposed by their civilian leaders, yet they still agreed that the mission could be accomplished within them . Westmoreland believed that he had found a strategy that would either defeat North Vietnam or force it into serious negotiations . Attrition was to be the key . The general held that larger offensive operations would grind down the communists and eventually lead to a "crossover point" in PAVN / NLF casualties after which a decisive (or at least political) victory would be possible . </P> <P> It is widely held that the average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old, as evidenced by the casual reference in a pop song ("19" by Paul Hardcastle); the figure is cited by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. of the Killology Research Group in his 1995 book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (p. 265). However, it is disputed by the Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network Website, which claims the average age of MOS 11B personnel was 22 . This compares with 26 years of age for those who participated in World War II . Soldiers served a one - year tour of duty . The average age of the U.S. military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years old . </P>

Years of american involvement in the vietnam war