<P> "Stop and identify" laws in different states that appear to be nearly identical may be different in effect because of interpretations by state courts . For example, California "stop and identify" law, Penal Code § 647 (e) had wording similar to the Nevada law upheld in Hiibel, but a California appellate court, in People v. Solomon (1973), 33 Cal. App. 3d 429 construed the law to require "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity . Using this construction, the U.S. Supreme Court held the law to be void for vagueness in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). </P> <P> Some courts have recognized a distinction authorizing police to demand identifying information and specifically imposing an obligation of a suspect to respond . Other courts have apparently interpreted demand to impose an obligation on the detainee to comply . </P> <P> Wording and interpretation by state courts of "obstructing" laws also varies; for example, New York "obstructing" law apparently requires physical rather than simply verbal obstruction; likewise, a violation of the Colorado "obstructing" law appears to require use or threat of use of physical force . However, the Colorado Supreme Court held in Dempsey v. People, No. 04SC362 (2005) (PDF) that refusing to provide identification was an element in the "totality of the circumstances" that could constitute obstructing an officer, even when actual physical interference was not employed . Utah "obstructing" law does not require a physical act, but merely a failure to follow a "lawful order...necessary to effect the...detention"; a divided court in Oliver v. Woods concluded that failure to present identification constituted a violation of that law . </P> <P> It is not universally agreed that, absent a "stop and identify law", there is no obligation for a detainee to identify himself . For example, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Hiibel, California "stop and identify" statute was voided in Kolender v. Lawson . But in People v. Long, decided four years after Kolender, a California appellate court found no constitutional impropriety in a police officer's demand for written identification from a detainee . The issue before the Long court was a request for suppression of evidence uncovered in a search of the defendant's wallet, so the issue of refusal to present identification was not directly addressed; however, the author of the Long opinion had apparently concluded in a 1980 case that failure to identify oneself did not provide a basis for arrest . Nonetheless, some cite Long in maintaining that refusal to present written identification constitutes obstructing an officer . Others disagree, and maintain that persons detained by police in California cannot be compelled to identify themselves . </P>

Can a cop id you for no reason