<P> Congress may lay and collect taxes for the "common defense" or "general welfare" of the United States . The U.S. Supreme Court has not often defined "general welfare," leaving the political question to Congress . In United States v. Butler (1936), the Court for the first time construed the clause . The dispute centered on a tax collected from processors of agricultural products such as meat; the funds raised by the tax were not paid into the general funds of the treasury, but were rather specially earmarked for farmers . The Court struck down the tax, ruling that the general welfare language in the Taxing and Spending Clause related only to "matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare". Congress continues to make expansive use of the Taxing and Spending Clause; for instance, the social security program is authorized under the Taxing and Spending Clause . </P> <P> Congress has the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States . In 1871, when deciding Knox v. Lee, the Court ruled that this clause permitted Congress to emit bills and make them legal tender in satisfaction of debts . Whenever Congress borrows money, it is obligated to repay the sum as stipulated in the original agreement . However, such agreements are only "binding on the conscience of the sovereign", as the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents a creditor from suing in court if the government reneges its commitment . </P> <P> The Congress shall have Power (...) To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; </P> <P> The Supreme Court has seldom restrained the use of the commerce clause for widely varying purposes . The first important decision related to the commerce clause was Gibbons v. Ogden, decided by a unanimous Court in 1824 . The case involved conflicting federal and state laws: Thomas Gibbons had a federal permit to navigate steamboats in the Hudson River, while the other, Aaron Ogden, had a monopoly to do the same granted by the state of New York . Ogden contended that "commerce" included only buying and selling of goods and not their transportation . Chief Justice John Marshall rejected this notion . Marshall suggested that "commerce" included navigation of goods, and that it "must have been contemplated" by the Framers . Marshall added that Congress's power over commerce "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution". </P>

The enumerated powers in article 1 of the constitution where intended to