<Li> Extend the vesting period of executives' stock and options . Current vesting periods can be as short as three years, which encourages managers to inflate short - term stock price at the expense of long - run value, since they can sell their holdings before a decline occurs . </Li> <Li> As passed in the Swiss referendum "against corporate Rip - offs" of 2013, investors gain total control over executive compensation, and the executives of a board of directors . Institutional intermediaries must all vote in the interests of their beneficiaries and banks are prohibited from voting on behalf of investors . </Li> <Li> Disclosure of salaries is the first step, so that company stakeholders can know and decide whether or not they think remuneration is fair . In the UK, the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 introduced a requirement into the old Companies Act 1985, the requirement to release all details of pay in the annual accounts . This is now codified in the Companies Act 2006 . Similar requirements exist in most countries, including the U.S., Germany, and Canada . </Li> <Li> A say on pay - a non-binding vote of the general meeting to approve director pay packages, is practised in a growing number of countries . Some commentators have advocated a mandatory binding vote for large amounts (e.g. over $5 million). The aim is that the vote will be a highly influential signal to a board to not raise salaries beyond reasonable levels . The general meeting means shareholders in most countries . In most European countries though, with two - tier board structures, a supervisory board will represent employees and shareholders alike . It is this supervisory board which votes on executive compensation . </Li>

Describe the operations and benefits of stock options