<P> The judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested, in Chapter III of the Constitution, in the High Court and such other courts as the Parliament creates or invests with Federal jurisdiction . In Australian constitutional jargon, such courts are called "Chapter III courts". The members of Chapter III courts may not be removed except by the Governor - General on an address from both Houses of Parliament on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity; they otherwise hold office until the age of 70 . </P> <P> In separate cases in 1915, and 1918, the High Court held that "judicial power" (essentially, the power of interpretation of the law and enforcement of decisions) could not be invested in anything other than a Chapter III court, and specifically, in anything other than a body whose members have life tenure . In Kruger v Commonwealth the High Court considered claims by members of the Stolen Generation, including that their removal and subsequent detention without due process was in contravention of the Constitution . Dawson J, and McHugh J, held that the Constitution contained no general guarantee of due process of law . Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ held that the removal of Indigenous children was not the exercise of judicial power, hence no question of due process arose . </P> <P> The converse of the separation of powers is the decision of the High Court in Boilermakers' Case in 1956, that Chapter III courts cannot be invested with anything other than judicial power . To some extent the rigour of the separation of powers doctrine was softened by the Court's subsequent acceptance that judges could, constitutionally, be assigned functions in their personal capacity as judges rather than as members of a Chapter III court . But this raised the question of which such functions were compatible with the simultaneous holding of Federal judicial office . The answers offered by the Court have been controversial and involved some very fine distinctions: for instance, it has held that a power to authorize telephone interceptions is compatible, while a power to make recommendations concerning the protection of land which might be of heritage significance to Aboriginals is not compatible . The most striking application (and extension) of this "incompatibility" doctrine, however, has involved the Supreme Court of the State of New South Wales, a court that may be invested with Federal jurisdiction . Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) concerned a criminal law passed by the New South Parliament and directed at a single named individual (somewhat in the manner of a Bill of attainder). </P> <P> The individual was a prisoner (under state law) whose sentence was about to expire but who was alleged to have made threats against the safety of various persons, to be carried out when released . The State Parliament enacted a law, applying only to him, which authorized the Supreme Court of New South Wales to make "preventive detention orders" for periods up to six months, with the possibility of renewal . The orders were to be made if the Court was satisfied, "on the balance of probabilities", that the person to whom the Act applied was "more likely than not to commit a serious act of violence". </P>

Which of the following is not a feature of the commonwealth constitution