<P> An action of libel required the same five general points as slander, except that it specifically involved the publication of defamatory statements . For certain criminal charges of libel, such as seditious libel, the truth or falsity of the statements was immaterial, as such laws were intended to maintain public support of the government and true statements could damage this support even more than false ones . Instead, libel placed specific emphasis on the result of the publication . Libelous publications tended to "degrade and injure another person" or "bring him into contempt, hatred or ridicule". </P> <P> Concerns that defamation under common law might be incompatible with the new republican form of government caused early American courts to struggle between William Blackstone's argument that the punishment of "dangerous or offensive writings...(was) necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty" and the argument that the need for a free press guaranteed by the Constitution outweighed the fear of what might be written . Consequently, very few changes were made in the first two centuries after the ratification of the First Amendment . </P> <P> The Supreme Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) fundamentally changed American defamation law . The case redefined the type of "malice" needed to sustain a libel case . Common law malice consisted of "ill - will" or "wickedness". Now, a public officials seeking to sustain a civil action against a tortfeasor needed to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that there was actual malice . The case involved an advertisement published in The New York Times indicating that officials in Montgomery, Alabama had acted violently in suppressing the protests of African - Americans during the civil rights movement . The Montgomery Police Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, sued the Times for libel, stating that the advertisement damaged his reputation . The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the $500,000 judgment against the Times . Justice Brennan suggested that public officials may sue for libel only if the publisher published the statements in question with "actual malice"--"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not ." In sum, the court held that "the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity)." </P> <P> While actual malice standard applies to public officials and public figures, in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps (1988), the Court found that, with regard to private individuals, the First Amendment does "not necessarily force any change in at least some features of the common - law landscape ." In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) the Court ruled that "actual malice" need not be shown in cases involving private individuals, holding that "(i) n light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern...the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages--even absent a showing of' actual malice ."' In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court ruled that a private individual had to prove actual malice only to be awarded punitive damages, but not to seek actual damages . In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), the Court extended the "actual malice" standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress in a ruling which protected parody, in this case a fake advertisement in Hustler suggesting that evangelist Jerry Falwell's first sexual experience had been with his mother in an outhouse . Since Falwell was a public figure, the Court ruled that "importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" was the paramount concern, and reversed the judgement Falwell had won against Hustler for emotional distress . </P>

Freedoms of expression guaranteed in the first amendment