<P> The US requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25 . US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles . Ambassador Zorin refused to answer . The next day at 10: 00 pm EDT, the US raised the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2 . For the only confirmed time in US history, B - 52 bombers went on continuous airborne alert, and B - 47 medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian airfields and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes' notice . One eighth of SAC's 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, and some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, some of which targeted Cuba, and Air Defense Command (ADC) redeployed 161 nuclear - armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours, with one third maintaining 15 - minute alert status . Twenty - three nuclear - armed B - 52s were sent to orbit points within striking distance of the Soviet Union so that it would believe that the US was serious . Jack J. Catton later estimated that about 80 percent of SAC's planes were ready for launch during the crisis; David A. Burchinal recalled that, by contrast: </P> <P> the Russians were so thoroughly stood down, and we knew it . They didn't make any move . They did not increase their alert; they did not increase any flights, or their air defense posture . They didn't do a thing, they froze in place . We were never further from nuclear war than at the time of Cuba, never further . </P> <P> By October 22, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one - hour alert status . However, TAC and the Military Air Transport Service had problems . The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support echelons, which faced critical undermanning in security, armaments, and communications; the absence of initial authorization for war - reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call - up of 24 Reserve squadrons . </P> <P> On October 25 at 1: 45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram by stating that the US was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and when the assurances proved to be false, the deployment "required the responses I have announced...I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation ." </P>

Who ordered the us and the ussr to reach a compromise