<P> For a more complete description of the model, see Endsley (1995b) and Endsley (2004). See also Endsley (2000) for a review of other models of SA . </P> <P> Any model of situation awareness depends on cognitive and shared cognitive processes, and yet'...models of SA refer to cognitive processes in general terms, but do not specify exactly what processes are involved and to what extent .' (Banbury & Tremblay, 2004, p. xiii). This criticism is an example of the difficulty that cognitive science has in addressing a concept such as SA, which through its definition and assumptions appears to stand robustly, however when the theorized processes are exposed at the cognitive level of analysis assumptions must be radically reviewed . Researchers have regularly raised these concerns - notably in Flach (1995) and more recently in Banbury & Tremblay (2004). To date the most widely cited model of SA is lacking in support from cognitive science, one notable observation that still stands is that: </P> <P>' The test of situation awareness as a construct will be in its ability to be operationalized in terms of objective, clearly specified independent (stimulus manipulation) and dependent (response difference) variables...Otherwise, SA will be yet another buzzword to cloak scientists' ignorance .' (Flach, J., 1995, p. 155) </P> <P> Another criticism of the model comes from a study done in 2015 which looked at situational awareness in tasks where relevant knowledge about the task could be found through other mediums, other than directly asking the collaborator . It was found that in these types of tasks, verbal communication lengthens the time it takes to complete a task when compared to people completing a task individually . </P>

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