<P> While the assassinations were planned out, there was no actual mention of assassinations in the original plan; the want for these assassinations became known during the training phase . The plan of PBSUCCESS was to try and remove the Guatemalan government without the use of assassination . The CIA and State Department were torn on whether or not assassinations would be necessary to complete this mission . A memo from the Western Hemisphere division suggested assassinating key Guatemalan military officers if they refused to join the rebellion against Arbenz . Trujillos trained pistoleros would be utilized in order to eliminate the top leaders of Guatemala . By eliminating the leaders it would make it easier for the army to take over . An elaborate plan was created that laid everything leading up until D - Day . PBSUCCESS also included a sixth stage, that being plans to remove opposition after a successful coup also . PBHISTORY was the final phase of the operation that was to obtain documentation left behind by President Arbenz's administration . Frank Wisner wanted to take every opportunity he could to try to expose Soviet connections to the Western hemisphere which included trying to show the communist qualities of the Arbenz rule . The Army and Castillo Arma's junta were able to obtain around 150,000 documents, however very few of these actually showed a connection to the Soviets . Later examination of said documents had no found no proof of possible Soviet Control within Guatemala, only Guatemalan communists had been acting on their own . Agents created a booklet containing the obtained documents which specifically showed photographs of Arbenz's library filled with Marxist texts, Chinese communists materials, and a copy of Stalin's biography . As well as, evidence of an attempt to purchase weapons from Italy along with cables from Arbenz that contained strong communist influences . This booklet was then circulated to the National Security Council (NSC), members of the Senate and other officials whom shown interest . Unfortunately the NSC was unimpressed by the material and required more incriminating evidence on Arbenz . </P> <P> In January 1954, the Guatemalan Government began mass arrests of suspected subversives and accused the US of a plot to invade . PBSUCCESS, authorized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in August 1953, was the codename for the CIA's first covert operation in Latin America, carried out in Guatemala . PBSUCCESS carried a $2.7 million budget for "psychological warfare and political action" and "subversion," among other paramilitary war components . By recruiting a Guatemalan military force, the CIA's operation succeeded in overthrowing the Árbenz government and replacing it with a military junta headed by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas . Arbenz resigned from his presidency on June 27, 1954 and fled the country with his top aids, leaving behind hundreds of Guatemalan . after the installment of the Castillo Armas by the CIA and after Arbenz left, hundreds of Guatemalan were killed . Human rights group estimated that between the year of 1954 and 1990, more than 100,000 civilians were murdered by the successive military regimes . </P> <P> "Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalans...took place in a historical era quite different from the present . In the documents, however, was an unsigned, undated technical discussion of assassination . In compliance with the "Openness" program of 1995, a CIA staff historian, George Haines, was assigned to write a brief history of CIA activities in Guatemala . According to this report, the CIA began collecting the names of possible assassination targets within the Arbenz government as early as January 1952 . These names were deleted in the declassified documents, taking away any verification of their survival pre / post-coup . </P> <P> Two declassified CIA documents reveal such a discussion of assassination of Guatemalans . The first document, from March 1954 refers to a list requested by an unknown CIA official of government officials, members of the Communist Party, and others "of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or others reasons is mandatory for the success of military action" and asks for a final list to be narrowed down for "disposal" by the Junta group, though the names of any individuals, CIA, Guatemalan, or otherwise, were withheld . The conditions for selecting names to add to the list were broken down into three conditions: the target had to be, a Communist driven politician who was not outwardly supportive of Communism, a public Communist whose elimination was necessary for the success of the future government, or a military target whose elimination was necessary for certain military actions . The memorandum was addressed to "All Staff Officers," and included instructions for its circulation, requesting input ("Your careful consideration is requested in making additions or deletions"), so that the "planning (could) proceed on schedule ." Psychological warfare was also brought upon the individuals on this list . Mourning cards were used in an attempt to scare off the communist leaders and supporters . These cards threatened communist political figures and were meant to foreshadow their assassinations . The dissident leaders wanted to take the psychological warfare in a more violent direction at one point, recommending that eliminating a top communist official would help the resistance movement . The CIA advised against this and said that it would not be beneficial to resistance and that it would "set off wholesale reprisals". The A second document from an unspecified date (though after February 1952, according to point 2) introduces a list of "Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of (...) by Calligeris ." The list was split into two categories, Category I and Category II, Category I was a list of people to be taken out by means of executive action and Category II which was individuals selected to be imprisoned or exiled . Of the two categories, 58 individuals (names withheld) to be disposed of through "Executive action" and 74 individuals to be imprisoned or exiled . A description of this second document found on the National Security Archive webpage by Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh notes that the "Executive action" for members of the first category likely means "killed"; however, this information cannot be verified through these documents . This description also states that "Calligeris" was the code - name given to Castillo Armas by the CIA . The Guatemalan exiles that were trained in Honduras were led by Carlos Armas and later Carlos Diaz agreed to lead the group against Arbenz . Castillo Armas' CIA - supported force entered Guatemala on June 16, 1954 . Despite the intense focus on assassination, the Árbenz coup would be relatively bloodless, with less than 200 people killed overall Árbenz would be forced to seek asylum in the Mexican embassy of Guatemala City on June 27, 1954, where he stayed until he and 120 other Guatemalan officials would leave Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the new Armas' government . There is no evidence that any executions orchestrated by the CIA were carried out . </P>

Explain the cia's role in guatemala and the u-2 incident