<P> Philip Balsiger points out that political consumption (e.g., boycotts) tends to follow dual - purpose action repertoires, or scripts, which are used publicly to pressure boycott targets and to educate and recruit consumers . Balsiger finds one example in Switzerland, documenting activities of the Clean Clothes Campaign, a public NGO - backed campaign, that highlighted and disseminated information about local companies' ethical practices . </P> <P> Dixon, Martin, and Nau analyzed 31 collective behavior campaigns against corporations that took place during the 1990s and 2000s . Protests considered successful included boycotts and were found to include a third party, either in the capacity of state intervention or of media coverage . State intervention may make boycotts more efficacious when corporation leaders fear the imposition of regulations . Media intervention may be a crucial contributor to a successful boycott because of its potential to damage the reputation of a corporation . Target corporations that were the most visible were found to be the most vulnerable to either market (protest causing economic loss) or mediated (caused by third - party) disruption . Third - party actors (i.e., the state or media) were more influential when a corporation had a high reputation--when third - party activity was low, highly reputable corporations did not make the desired concessions to boycotters; when third - party activity was high, highly reputable corporations satisfied the demands of boycotters . The boycott, a prima facie market - disruptive tactic, often precipitates mediated disruption . The researchers' analysis led them to conclude that when boycott targets are highly visible and directly interact with and depend on local consumers who can easily find substitutes, they are more likely to make concessions . Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer also emphasize the importance of boycotts' threat of reputational damage, finding that boycotts alone pose more of a threat to a corporation's reputation than to its finances directly . </P> <P> Philippe Delacote points out that a problem contributing to a generally low probability of success for any boycott is the fact that the consumers with the most power to cause market disruption are the least likely to participate; the opposite is true for consumers with the least power . Another collective behavior problem is the difficulty, or impossibility, of direct coordination amongst a dispersed group of boycotters . Yuksel and Mryteza emphasize the collective behavior problem of free riding in consumer boycotts, noting that some individuals may perceive participating to be too great an immediate personal utility sacrifice . They also note that boycotting consumers took the collectivity into account when deciding to participate, that is, consideration of joining a boycott as goal - oriented collective activity increased one's likelihood of participating . A corporation - targeted protest repertoire including boycotts and education of consumers presents the highest likelihood for success . </P> <P> Boycotts are generally legal in developed countries . Occasionally, some restrictions may apply; for instance, in the United States, it may be unlawful for a union to engage in "secondary boycotts" (to request that its members boycott companies that supply items to an organization already under a boycott, in the United States); however, the union is free to use its right to speak freely to inform its members of the fact that suppliers of a company are breaking a boycott; its members then may take whatever action they deem appropriate, in consideration of that fact . </P>

Which kind of person is the least likely to participate in a protest